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2003]
"I AM PRO-CHOICE, PRO-UNION AND I OPPOSE CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT-I WANT YOU TO ELECT ME TO THE
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT": IS THIS THE
FUTURE OF PENNSYLVANIA'S JUDICIAL ELECTIONS?

"The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential
in a limited Constitution."I
I.

INTRODUCTION

Should attorneys who are running for the bench, or incumbent
judges attempting to remain on the bench, be allowed to say whatever they
want during their campaigns? 2 Consider the following hypothetical statement: "If elected to this state's Supreme Court, I will impartially uphold
existing law. I am pro-choice, pro-Union and I oppose capital punishment." Does this sound like someone who would impartially administer
justice?
The debate over the optimal method ofjudicial selection has lingered
since the birth of our nation.3 The main point of contention in this
heated debate is typically whether state judges should be selected by appointment or general election. 4 In fact, state judicial selection methodology was most uniform when the thirteen "original" states all appointed
judges; this was, of course, accomplished through different legislative
5
mechanisms.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 434 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1999).
2. Cf generally Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionalityand Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign Speech by CandidatesforJudicialOffice, 35 UCLA L. Rv. 207 (1987)
(arguing that judicial candidates should be permitted to comment freely).
3. See THE FEDERALIsT Nos. 76-77, at 427-32 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1999) (arguing judges and other proposed government officials
should be appointed and not elected).
4. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand
the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 689, 691-93 (1995) (discussing general pros and
cons of electing and appointing judges). The appointment method ofjudicial selection is also known as a "merit" system and will thus be referred to interchangeably throughout this Note. See id. at 724 n.109 (noting "merit plan" entails
appointing judges who are most qualified).
5. See

LARRY BERKSON

ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATEs:

A

3 (1980) (discussing different methods ofjudicial appointment in early America). Amid burgeoning Federalist sentiment, the original
thirteen states modeled their judicial selection systems after the federal merit system. See id. (discussing early American judicial selection systems). Thus, state
judges were appointed by three methods: (1) one or both houses of the state legislature; (2) the governor; or (3) the governor with legislative approval. See id.
(same).
COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONs

(911)
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In the early 1800s, however, the states shifted towards populist governance, resulting in the popular election of statejudges. 6 Since that time, in
an effort to strike a fair balance between judicial integrity and government
"by the people," the states have continuously enacted and experimented
with different methods of judicial selection. 7 These coexisting laboratories of democracy, however, ultimately produced the current situation in
8
which no state utilizes the same method of judicial selection as another.
Thus, the heated debate over whether state judges should be appointed or
elected currently retains ample fervor. 9 From this debacle, further issues
concerning the effect of state ethical codes upon judicial candidates' campaign conduct have recently emerged."I
The states have generally adopted, in whole or with minor amendments, the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Code ofJudicial Ethics (ABA Model Code). I Recently, provisions in state versions of the ABA
Model Code concerning judicial campaign conduct have resulted in especially fierce litigation. 1 2 Interestingly, these scrutinized ethical provisions

6. See

DANIEL

R.

PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION

METHOD ON

2 (1995) (discussing methods of judicial selection in early America). For a discussion of the
history ofjudicial selection in the United States, see infra, notes 7-10, 25-41 and
accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Justice Paul J. De Muniz, PoliticizingState JudicialElections: A Threat
to Judicial Independence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REx'. 367, 377 (2002) (discussing Oregon's 1931 legislative act creating non-partisan judicial elections to replace former
partisan elections).
STATE-SUPREME COURT POLICY: INNOVATION, REACTION, AND ATROPHY

8. See BERKSON

ET AL.,

supra note 5, at 6 (noting lack of uniformity amongst

state judicial mechanisms).
9. See David Barnhizer, "On the Make:" Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of
the AmericanJudiciary,50 CATH. U. L. REv. 361, 413-14 (2001) (illustrating flaws in
arguments promoting election and appointment of judges).
10. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 2, at 228-29 (arguing that various state ethics
codes' restrictions upon judicial campaign speech violate candidates' First Amendment rights). In this Note, the term "judicial candidate" denotes attorneys running for judicial office as well as incumbent judges up for re-election. State
judicial ethics codes apply to both categories of candidates during elections. See,
e.g.,
PA. CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) (1) (2002) (expressing application
to candidates and incumbent judges).
11. See LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 'rTHE ABA .JUDICIAL COD)E 7
(1992) (discussing ABA's most recent Model Code's creation). For a discussion of
the evolution of the ABA Model Code's effect upon judicial campaign speech, see
infra notes 14-16, 42-52 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct. of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 144
(3d Cir. 1991) (upholding Pennsylvania restriction upon judicial candidates announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues); see also MODEL CODE
OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 5, 7 (1990) (collecting ethical provisions applying to
'judicial candidates during their campaigns); Snyder, supra note 2, at 212-14 (discussing ABA Model Code's various prohibitions concerning political campaign
conduct that raises inferences of impartiality).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss3/5

2

Simmons: I Am Pro-Choice, Pro-Union and I Oppose Capital Punishment - I Wa

20031

NOTE

913

were actually written for the noble purpose of preserving judicial
impartiality. 13
The 1972 ABA Model Code prohibited judicial candidates from "announc[ing] . . . [their] views on disputed legal or political issues;" this is
commonly referred to as the "announce clause." 14 At least four states currently maintain this restriction.15 Recently, however, ajudicial candidate
challenged Minnesota's version of the announce clause under the First
Amendment.16 In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,17 the Supreme
Court held that Minnesota's version of the announce clause violated the
First Amendment. 18 Nonetheless, White's outcome raises additional ques-

13. See Snyder, supra note 2, at 212 (noting intent of ABA Code is to avoid
extra-judicial activity by judges which could undermine their impartiality).
14. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1972). For a discussion of the evolution of the ABA's proscription ofjudicial candidates discussing
disputed legal and political issues, see infra notes 15-19, 42-52 and accompanying
text.
15. See IowA CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) (1) (c) (2002) ("Uudicial
candidates] . . .should not . . .announce views on disputed legal or political issues."); MD. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B) (5) (2002) (same); MINN.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (i) (2002) (same); Mo. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B) (1) (c) (2002) (same). Pennsylvania's judicial code
also originally prevented judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues. See PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
7(B)(1)(c) (2002) ("[Judicial] candidate[s] ...should not .. .announce [their]
views on disputed legal or political issues."). On November 21, 2002, however, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced that it was amending Canon 7(B)(1)(c)
to conform with the 1990 ABA Model Code, which prevents judicial candidates
from making statements "that commit or appear to commit the candidate with
respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court."
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A) (3)(d)(ii) (1990); see alsoJeff Blumenthal, Pennsylvania Justices Alter Judicial Election Conduct Rules, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 25, 2002, at 1 (discussing amendments to Pennsylvania's judicial
code).
16. Seegenerally Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 996 F. Snpp. 875 (D. Minn.
1998) (denying plaintiff's motions for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief against state from enforcing its judicial code to prohibitjudicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues),
affd, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27946 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 1998) (unpublished opinion);
see also Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 986 (D. Minn. 1999)
(granting state's motion for summary judgment as to all claims that Minnesota's
various restrictions upon judicial candidates' campaign conduct violates First
Amendment rights), aff'd, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. granted,534 U.S. 1054
(2001) (granting certiorari only to issue of whether Minnesota's restrictions upon
judicial candidates announcing their views on disputed issues violates First Amendment), rev'd sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002).
For a discussion of the relevant facts and procedural history in White, see infia
notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
17. 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002).
18. See id. at 2542 (invalidating Minnesota's announce clause for violating judicial candidates' First Amendment rights).
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tions concerning the future of state judicial elections across the country,

and especially in Pennsylvania. 9
This Note addresses the role that White and its rationale has had upon
Pennsylvania's judicial code, as well as its potential effect upon future judicial elections. Part II summarizes the development of judicial selection
and ethics in the United States, with its main focus on Minnesota and

Pennsylvania law.21 Part II also discusses the First Amendment's application to state elections. 2 1 Part III discusses the facts and procedural history
of the White decision. 2 2 Part IV summarizes the Court's rationale in White,
while Part V critiques that rationale. 2 3 Finally, Part VI addresses White's

immediate and potential impact upon Pennsylvania's upcoming judicial
24
elections.
II.

BACKGROUND

Part II first discusses the history of judicial selection in the United
States, followed by the evolution ofjudicial ethics concerning judicial cam-

paign speech. Finally, Part II addresses the First Amendment's application
to campaign speech.
A.

The History and Evolution ofJudicialSelection in the United States

During the Colonial Era of the early Eighteenth Century, England's
ruling monarch appointed judges and often retained the lion's share of
authority over these "impartial" arbiters of English law. 25 As a result,
American states have since strived to maintain judicial selection systems
preserving "that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential
to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty." 26 The Framers re19. For a discussion of White's potential effects upon Pennsylvania judicial
elections, see infra notes 188-206 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the evolution of judicial selection, as well as judicial
ethics concerning free speech in the United States, see infra notes 25-52 and ac-

companying text.
21. For a discussion of the First Amendment's application to state legislative
and judicial elections, see infra notes 53-92 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of White's relevant facts and procedural history, see infra
notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the various opinions rendered in White, see infra notes
106-63 and accompanying text. Also, for a critique of the various opinions rendered in White, see infra notes 164-87 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of White's immediate and potential effects upon Pennsylvania's future judicial elections, see infra notes 188-206 and accompanying text.
25. See BERKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 3-4 (discussing early judicial selection

systems). The English Monarchs' omnipresent power over their appointed judges
was even listed as a grievance in the Declaration of Independence. See Croley,
supra note 4, at 714 (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S.

1776)) ("He [the King] has made Judges dependant on his Will alone, for the
tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.").
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1999) (discussing desirable qualities for America's judiciary).
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27
garded appointive systems as the optimal method of judicial selection.
The original thirteen states similarly appointed state judges in the late

1700s.

28

In the early Nineteenth Century, however, the states' appointivejudicial selection systems experienced criticism and rapid decline. 29 In 1812,
Georgia amended its constitution to provide for the election of trial
judges; it was the first state to do so.-° This concept of popular sovereignty
soon spread so rapidly that twenty-four out of thirty-four states elected
31
their judiciaries by the time of the Civil War.
The public quickly realized, however, that elected judiciaries were just
as prone to abuse as the former appointive judicial selection systems. 3 2 As
a result, some states tried to maintain public confidence in their judiciaries by amending their constitutions to allow non-partisan judicial elections. 33 These efforts temporarily ameliorated the problem, however, the
inequities of state judicial elections continued into the early 1900s, spurn27. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[President] appoints ...supreme Court
(judges]."). Discussing methods of selecting officers to lead the new Union, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the "merit" system was the best calculated system to
retain able and judicious individuals. See THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (explaining that vesting responsibility
of appointing judges in one individual [President] inspires responsibility, duty and
care seldom present in popular elections). Hamilton further wrote that life tenure
was essential in maintaining independent judges because "periodic appointments... would.., be fatal to their independence." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at
439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (elaborating that judges'
requisite expertise in legal precedent further mandated life tenure).
28. For a discussion of the original thirteen states' methods of judicial appointment, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
29. See BERKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 3-4 (discussing development ofjudicial
elections in early America).
30. See id. at 3 (discussing Georgia's constitutional amendment providing for
popular election ofjudges).
31. See id. at 3-4 (attributing new state methods of electing judges to populist
thought underJacksonian Democracy); see also PINELLO, supra note 6, at 2 (same).
During the early 1800s, the general public became dissatisfied with property owners' alleged control over the appointive judicial selection process. See BERKSON ET
AL., supra note 5, at 3 (discussing rise ofjudicial elections in early America).
32. See BERKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 4 (discussing judicial elections' rapid
demise in spite of their rapid ascent to popularity). Judicial elections were actually
criticized as early as 1853 by the Massachusetts Legislature when it declined to
adopt such a system. See id. (noting rising division over judicial selection in early
America). The Massachusetts Legislature cited New York's failed judicial election
system as a primary reason for not amending the state's Constitution. See id. (discussing Massachusetts Legislature's rejection of judicial elections).
33. See id. (noting that goal of having judges unencumbered by special interests had not been attained). The first non-partisan judicial elections took place in
Cook County, Illinois in 1873, however, by 1927, only twelve states utilized that
method ofjudicial selection. See id. (discussing short-lived popularity of non-partisan judicial elections). Interestingly, Pennsylvania had already adopted and subsequently abandoned non-partisan judicial elections by 1927. See id. (discussing
rapid decline of judicial elections in America in early 1900s); see also PA. CONST.
art. V, § 13(a) (providing for popular partisan election of state judges).
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ing demands for reform.3 4 In 1940, Missouri responded to this dilemma
by adopting an innovative judicial selection system consisting of guberna35
torial appointment, aided by a non-partisan advisory committee.

Today, no two states select their judiciary in precisely the same man3 c6

ner. Thus, the debate over the optimal method ofjudicial selection continues.3 7 In Pennsylvania, for example, most state judges are selected by
partisan elections to ten-year terms.3 8 Incumbent state judges subsequently run unopposed in retention elections for the same term of service.'" Minnesota's judges, on the other hand, are selected by general
non-partisan elections to six-year terms. 4 0 While Pennsylvania and Minne34. See BERKSON ET AL., suplra note 5, at 4 (discussing rising public criticism of
judicial elections). State judicial elections gained such ill repute during the early
1900s that Roscoe Pound, in a well-known address to the American Bar Association
in 1906, stated that, "putting courts into politics, and compelling judges to become
politicians... [had] almost destroyed the traditional respect for the bench." Id. at
5.
35. See id. (explaining non-partisan advisory committee in so-called Missouri
System consisted of lawyers and non-lawyers). Albert Kales, a faculty member at
Northwestern University School of Law during the early 1900s, allegedly invented
the Missouri System of judicial selection. See Croley, supra note 4, at 724 (discussing evolution of elected judiciaries in America). Professor Kales's plan originally
provided for legislative aid in the appointment process, as well as subsequent retention elections to maintain the general public's participation in the judicial selection process. See id. (describing as well as discussing pros and cons of Professor
Kales's system of judicial selection).
36. For a comparison between Minnesota's and Pennsylvania's respective
methods of judicial selection exemplifying the non-uniformity in state judicial selection, see infra notes 3841 and accompanying text.
37. See PINELLO, supra note 6, at 2-3 (discussing theory that judicial elections
open state selection process to many groups who are not ordinarily exposed to it,
while bar associations, chambers of commerce and commercial groups usually
dominate appointment systems); see also Throw Out the Baby; AbolishJudicialElections,
Not Contributions,Prvr. POsT-GAZEITrE, Jan. 17, 2001, at A8 [hereinafter Throw Out
the Baby] (arguing that Pennsylvania judges should be appointed, not elected).
38. See PA. CONsT. art. V, §§ 13, 15 (providing for popular election of most
judges to ten-year terms); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 3131, 3152(a)(3) (West 2002)
(same). Although Philadelphia's municipal and traffic court judges are similarly
elected, they only serve six-year terms. See PA. CONsr. art. V, § 15(a) (mandating
six-year terms); see also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 3131, 3152(a) (1) (mandating popular election for six-year terms). Pittsburgh's magistrate judges are appointed by
the mayor, with the advice and consent of the city council, for an undetermined
term; the mayor also assigns magistrate judges to traffic court. See PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 42, §§ 1331, 3131(d), 3152(a)(2) (West 2002) (requiring that neither magistrate nor traffic cotitjudges may all be members of same political party).
39. See PA. CONsT. art. V, § 15(b) (providing that incumbent judges may elect
to run unopposed). It should be noted that Pennsylvania's governor fills all premature judicial vacancies, provided that such appointments are made with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the state senate. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(b)
(stating procedure for filling premature court vacancies).
40. See MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (providing for general election ofjudges for
six-year terms); MINN. STAr. ANN. §§ 480A.02, 487.03 (West 2002) (same); see also
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 488A.19 (West 2002) (mandating general elections for Ramsey
County municipal judges to six-year terms).
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sota may have different judicial selection systems, both states formerly
4
agreed to restrict judicial campaign speech. '

B.

THE

ABA,

MINNESOTA AND PENNSYLVANIA JUDICIAL CODES OF

CONDUCT AND CAMPAIGN SPEECH RESTRICTIONS

Responding to various problems with the American bench, the ABA
promulgated its first Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 1924.42 In an
effort to promote judicial integrity, the 1924 ABA Model Code provided
that a judicial candidate "should not announce in advance his conclusions
of law on disputed issues to secure class support." 43 In 1972, however, the
ABA amended this language along with a substantial portion of the Model
Code to provide that a judicial candidate should not "announce his views
on disputed legal or political issues" (the announce clause). 4 4 In re41. See MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2002)
(prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal
and political issues); PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCrF Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (2002)
(same). These restrictions have both been either invalidated or amended. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2542 (2002) (invalidating Minnesota's announce clause for First Amendment reasons); see also Blumenthal, supra
note 15, at I (discussing amendments to Pennsylvania's announce clause). For
further discussion of Minnesota's and Pennsylvania's restrictions on judicial campaign speech, see infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
42. See MILORD, supra note 11, at 6-7 (discussing history of judicial codes in
America); see alsoJustice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Foreword to JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET
AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCTr AND ETHICS, at vii (2000) (noting Chief Justice William
Howard Taft's involvement in drafting 1924 ABA Model Code). Commentators
have opined that the 1924 ABA Model Code actually resulted from the aftermath
of the 1919 World Series's infamous Black Sox Scandal. See id. (citing JOHN P.
MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OFJusTIcE 180-82 (1974)). Not uncharacteristically
looking for some credibility, Major League Baseball appointed United States District Judge Kennesaw Mountain Landis as Commissioner, paying him $42,500 a
year, while Judge Landis made $7,500 as a United States District Judge. See id.
(detailing possible background behind ABA's first Model Judicial Code). The
Framers would also view Judge Kennesaw's employment situation as a serious
threat to his judicial independence. SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) ("[P]ower over ... man's subsistence amounts
to . . . power over his will.").
43. MILORD, supra note 11, at 140-41 (quoting MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDuCr Canon 30 (1924)). Canon 30 was subsequently amended in 1933, however,
the ABA retained its language prohibiting candidates from announcing conclusions of law in advance to gain class support. See id. at 140 n.3 (discussing development of 1924 ABA Model Code). It should be noted that the 1924 ABA Model
Code also prohibited jrdges from giving "political speeches." See id. (citing MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCTr Canon 28 (1924)).
44. E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES -To CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 98
(1973) (noting that judicial candidates should not "base" their campaigns on their
ideas of "solutions to political problems"); see also MILORD, supra note 11, at 128
(citing MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDU(Tr Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1972)) (same).
The ABA Committee believed thatjudicial candidates should rely solely upon their
"ability, experience and record." See THODE, supra, at 98 (detailing adoption of
1972 ABA announce clause). Thode was sure to acknowledge, however, the apparent tension between democratic elections and the ABA Committee's ideal judicial
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sponse, the federal judiciary and an overwhelming majority of the states
adopted the 1972 ABA Model Code, either in whole or by incorporating
45
many of its provisions into their own judicial codes.
But, in 1990, the ABA again substantially revised the Model Code. 46
Concerned with the announce clause's burden upon judicial candidates'
First Amendment rights, the ABA amended its language to currently provide that judicial candidates should not "make statements that commit or
appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court."47 In response, at least
twenty-five states have adopted the announce clause's 1990 amended
version. 48 Conversely, at least four states have retained the announce
standards. See id. (noting announce clause's uncertainty concerning First Amendment rights).
45. See MILORD, supra note 11, at 7 (discussing history of judicial codes in
America); cf. MINN. CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(c) (1993) (prohibitingjudicial candidates and incumbents from announcing their views on disputed
legal and political issues).
46. See MILORD, supra note 11, at 3 (discussing revision of 1972 ABA Model
Code).
47. Id.at 50 (citing MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (ii)
(1990)). Commentary to Canon 5(A) (3) (d) provides that judicial candidates
should emphasize in their public statements that judges are bound to uphold the
law regardless of personal ideology. See MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(A) (3) (d) cmt. (1990) (elaborating that Canon 5(A) (3) (d) applies to statements
made during judicial elections and nominations). Canon 5(a) (3) (d) (ii) replaced
the former "broad" restriction against candidates stating their personal views on
disputed matters with a narrow restriction against committing, or appearing to
commit,on issues likely to come before the court. See MILORD, supra note 11, at 50
(noting that discussion draft originally prohibited judicial candidates from stating
"personal views" on matters likely to come before them, however, this language was
not retained). The ABA Committee believed that Canon 5(A)(3) (d) (ii) protected
judicial candidates' First Amendment rights much more effectively, while eliminating the appearance of impartiality and impropriety. See id. (noting that announce
clause was not practical in application, while "revised rule protects candidates from
improper questioning in polls and questionnaires").
48. See ALAsA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2002)
("[Judicial] candidate[s] ...shall not.., make statements that commit or appear
to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely
to come before the court."); ARIZ. Sup. CT. R. 81 Canon 5(B)(1)(d)(ii) (2002)
(same); ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (ii) (2002) (same);
Canon 5(B)(1) (2002) (same); FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2002) (same); CA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONCAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHIcS

DUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (2002) (same); ILL. SuP. CT. R. 67 Canon 7(A) (3) (d) (i)
(2000) (same); IND. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2002)
(same); Ky. SuP. CT. R. 4.300 Canon 5(B)(1)(c) (2002) (same); LA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(d)(ii) (2002) (same); ME. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B) (2) (b) (2002) (same); Miss. CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2002) (same); NEV. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(A) (3) (d) (ii) (2002) (same); N.M. CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT § 21-700(B) (4) (b)
(2002) (same); N.Y. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 100.5(A)(4)(d)(ii) (2002)
(same); N.D. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2002) (same);
OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) (2) (d) (2002) (same); OKIA.CODE
OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A) (3)(d) (ii) (2002) (same); R.I. CODE OFJUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (ii) (2002) (same); S.D. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
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Pennsylvania and Minnesota both initially retained the announce
clause's former version, prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing
Canon 5(A) (3) (d)(ii) (2002) (same); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 81 Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (ii)
(2002) (same); VT. CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(4)(b) (2001) (same);
WASH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c)(ii) (2002) (same); W. VA.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2002) (same); Wyo. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONruc:r Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (ii) (2002) (same). Additionally, at least two
states' judicial code provisions concerning campaign speech closely resemble the
announce clause's 1990 amended version. See ALA. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (2002) ("[J]udicial candidates ... shall not announce in advance
[their] conclusions of law."); COLO. CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) (1) (c)
(2002) ("IJ]udicial candidates ...should not.., announce how they would rule
on an issue coming before the court.").
49. See IOWA CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) (1) (c) (2002) (" [Judicial
candidates] .. .should not ... announce views on disputed legal or political issues."); MD. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(5) (2002) (same); MINN.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (i) (2002) (same); Mo. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (2002) (same). For a discussion of Pennsylvania's former announce clause as well as its subsequent amendments, see supra
note 15 and accompanying text. Kansas's judicial code limits the announce
clause's application to candidates' statements other than those in defense of their
record. See KAN. SuP. CT. R. 610A Canon 7(B) (2) (b) (2002) ("[n]or state the candidate's views on disputed legal and political issues except those directed at a candidate's record in office"). It should be noted that at least ten states do not limit
judicial campaign speech, but prohibit inappropriate political activity in general.
See CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (2002) (proscribing inappropriate
political activity in general); DEL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (2002)
(same); RAW. CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (1992) (same); MASS. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (2002) (same); MicFi. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (2002) (same); N.H. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (2002) (same);
NJ. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (1999) (same); N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 7 (2002) (same); OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT JR 4-102(B)
(2002) (same); UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (2002) (same); VA.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (2002) (same). Texas and Wisconsin, however, have adopted comparatively unique versions of the announce clause. See
TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(1) (2002) (prohibiting inappropriate
judicial campaign speech); Wis. SUP. CT. R. 60.06(3) (2002) (same). Texas's code
provides:
[Judicial candidates] shall not make statements that indicate an opinion
on any issue that may be subject to judicial interpretation by the office
which is being sought or held, except that discussion of an individual's
judicial philosophy is appropriate if conducted in a manner which does
not suggest to a reasonable person a probable decision on any particular
case.
TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(1) (2002). Wisconsin's code provides:
[Judicial candidates] shall not make or permit others to make in his or
her behalf promises or suggestions of conduct in office which appeal to
the cupidity or partisanship of the electing or appointing power. Ajudge
shall not do or permit others to do in his or her behalf anything which
would commit the judge in advance with respect to any particular case or
controversy or which suggests that, if elected or chosen, the judge would
administer his or her office with partiality, bias or favor.
Wis. SuP. CT. R. 60.06(3) (2002).
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their views on disputed legal and political issues. 5 1 In addition, both
states' versions of the announce clause were challenged under the First
Amendment. 5 ' The Supreme Court invalidated Minnesota's announce
clause in White, while Pennsylvania's announce clause was recently
amended in response to White, despite having survived its previous consti52
tutional challenge.
50. See MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (i) (providing
former Minnesota announce clause); PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUc-r Canon

7(B) (1) (c) (2002) (providing former Pennsylvania announce clause). Minnesota
has enforced the announce clause since at least 1993. See Republican Party of
Minn. v. Kelly, 996 F. Supp. 875, 876 (D. Minn. 1998) (discussing history of Minnesota announce clause). Although the Minnesota Supreme Court amended Canon
7 in 1995, the announce clause's present language was retained. See id. (discussing
briefly former Minnesota announce clause's background); see also MINN. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (i) (providing former Minnesota announce
clause). Pennsylvania's former Code ofJudicial Conduct did not comment on either the scope or purpose behind the announce clause, although it did mention
that Canon 7, containing the announce clause, was amended on November 9,
1998..See PA. CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (providing rules ofjudicial conduct for political activity). Pennsylvania's administrative code, however, requires
judicial campaigns to be conducted "with the dignity and integrity required of the
office ... [and] no references to ethnic groups, religions, sex, political or other
issues, which tend to stir up the emotions or impugn the candidate's capabilities
for functioning impartially and without bias." 207 PA. CODE § 39.3 (2002) (mandating further that "sensationalism" should be avoided). Furthermore, Pennsylvania judges are advised against conducting partisan political activities due to
the negative connotations that such activities translate to their impartiality. See 207
PA. CODE § 39.8 (2002) (discouraging judges from engaging in partisan political
activities).
51. Compare Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2542 (2002)
(declaring Minnesota's announce clause unconstitutional), with Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding Pennsylvania's announce
clause as constitutional).
52. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2542 (declaring Minnesota's announce clause unconstitutional); see also Blumenthal, supra note 15, at I (discussing amendments to
Pennsylvania's judicial code in light of Wtite). After White, Pennsylvania's announce clause remained in force until it was either challenged or amended by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Edward Walsh, Speech Restrictions on Judicial Candidates Struck Down, Pn-r. POsT-GAzE-rIE, June 28, 2002, at A15 (stating that Pennsylvania's announce clause still stands after White); see also Alyssa Litman,
Pennsylvania Rule on.JudicialSpeech Faces Challenges, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 15,
2002, at 5 (same). As a direct response to White, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
amended former Canon 7(B)(l)(c) on November 21, 2002 to conform with the
current ABA Model Code. See Blumenthal, supra note 15, at 1 (discussing amendments to Pennsylvania's announce clause in light of White). According to Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice Emeritus Stephen Zappala, the amendments
to Pennsylvania's announce clause sought to strike a balance between judicial impartiality and "practical considerations attending campaigns." See id. (discussing
purposes of amendment to Pennsylvania's judicial code). Due to the uncertainty
with which Pennsylvania's judicial candidates were left, it was quite likely that the
state supreme court would act to rectify the situation. Cf generally Cucchi v. Rollins
Protective Servs. Co., 574 A.2d 565 (Pa. 1990) (applying U.C.C. Article 2 to leases
by analogy where Pennsylvania's State Legislature had not yet adopted U.C.C. Article 2A, which explicitly deals with leases).
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The First Amendment in State Public Office Elections

Under the First Amendment, free political speech is a "core" right
traditionally regarded as the centerpiece of our Republican form of government. 53 There are, however, limited exceptions to the "core" right of
free political expression. 5 4 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has generally
characterized free and open debate on candidates' qualifications for public office as a similarly essential component of our government. 55 Thus,
the courts apply First Amendment protections broadly to statements made
53. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
222-23 (1989) (examining state restriction against political parties endorsing candidates in primary elections). The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Zealously regarded by the Framers as essential to citizens making informed decisions
when they vote, free campaign speech has become deeply engrained within our
political and social culture. See Snyder, supra note 2, at 216 (explaining that free
speech strengthens and holds government accountable). Thomas Jefferson acknowledged free speech in his inaugural address by inviting those opposing the
government to speak and to be left "undisturbed as monuments of the safety with
which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." ld.
at 216 n.46.
54. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 47-52 (1919) (determining that
government may regulate speech creating "clear and present danger"); see also
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947) (mandating that "clear and present danger" of regulated speech be imminent and not merely probable). Judicial and
legislative candidates do not create a "clear and present danger" by expressing
their opinions on issues of disputed legal or political significance. See Snyder,
supra note 2, at 222 (discussing impropriety of wedging political speech into traditional First Amendment exceptions). State governments may, however, enact limitations on a government civil service employee's ability to participate in political
campaigns to prevent undue pressure from their superiors. See United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564-65 (1973) (finding such restriction tunder Hatch Act necessary to help government employees administer state law according to legislative intent, not partisan interpretation);
Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 601 (1973) (same); United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1947) (upholding constitutionality of Hatch Act to promote government efficiency). For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions regarding libel law, see infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the
Supreme Court has upheld state ethical provisions modeled after the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Condtct prohibiting attorneys from making comments that
are likely to "materially prejudic[e] . . . an adjudicatory proceeding." Gentile v.
State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991) (balancing state interest in fair trials
with attorneys' First Amendment Rights). Justice Ginsburg would likely agree that
judicial candidates' campaign statements concerning disputed legal and political
issues would have the same effect as the attorneys' comments at issue in Gentile. See
Mhite, 122 S. Ct. at 2551 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing distinction between
judicial and legislative elections).
55. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 223 (stating that open debate on candidates' qualifications is essential to our political system). The Supreme Court has further facilitated public discussion and criticism of candidates and public officials by requiring
that such individuals demonstrate actual malice before damages may be awarded
in a state libel action tinder the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See N.Y. Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (invalidating jury award to local police commissioner because New York Times did not evince actual malice in printing fullpage advertisement criticizing police response to non-violent student demonstra-
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by candidates for public office. 56 This broad application requires courts
to examine state electoral restrictions directly implicating candidates' First
Amendment rights under strict scrutiny. 57 States must therefore narrowly
tailor their electoral restrictions to serve a compelling state interest under
58
the First Amendment.
State electoral restrictions that directly burden First Amendment
rights can occur in a variety of ways, from restrictions against political parties endorsing candidates in primary elections to proscriptions against
compensating petition circulators. 59 In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,6 11 for example, the Supreme Court examined a

"highly paternalistic approach" under California election law prohibiting
political parties from endorsing candidates in primary elections. 6 1 The
tion); see also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (extending rule
in Sullivan to candidates running for public office).
56. Cf Roy, 401 U.S. at 272 (requiring candidates to demonstrate actual malice before they can recover damages in state libel suits under First and Fourteenth
Amendments). The Roy court stated that the First Amendment facilitates a "marketplace of ideas" essential to the general public in holding government accountable. See id. ("[Clonstittitional guarantee of free speech has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to ... conduct of campaigns for political office."). A
candidate must "put[ ] before the voters every conceivable aspect of his public and
private life that he thinks may lead the electorate to gain a good impression of
him." Id. at 274.
57. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 222 (stating that state restriction against political parties endorsing candidates in primary elections must be narrowly tailored to serve
compelling state interest to be constitutional). Courts will not always apply strict
scrutiny to state electoral restrictions under the First Amendment. See Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) ("The rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights."). Strict scrutiny
therefore only applies to state electoral restrictions that "severely" impose upon
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See id. (describing need for strict scrutiny
analysis where electoral restrictions impose upon fundamental interests). Thus,
states must show that such restrictions are narrowly tailored by demonstrating that
they do not "unnecessarily circumscribe protected expression." See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidated county election
due to candidates' mistaken pledge to reduce their salary if elected).
58. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 222 (emphasizing that state power to regulate time,
place and manner of elections does not diminish its responsibility to observe candidates' First Amendment rights).
59. See id. (examining state restriction against political parties endorsing candidates in state primary elections); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420-27 (1988)
(examining state prohibition against paying petition circulators).
60. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
61. See id. at 223 (stating explicitly that state electoral restrictions arbitrarily
limiting candidates' ability to apprise voters of their views is "generally suspect").
In Eu, various political entities (parties) sued California Secretary of State March
Fong Eu, as well as other state officials in federal court. See id. at 219 (describing
facts giving rise to dispute). The parties alleged that California's restrictions on
political party primary campaign conduct, the selection and removal of political
committee members, the size of state central committees, the term of the state
central committee's chairperson (chairperson), the chairperson's residency, the
time and place of committee meetings and dtues imposed upon party members all
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Court found that despite California's interest in a "stable political system,"
banning primary candidate endorsements could not promote political stability because voters could potentially elect candidates with "antithetical"
party views. 62 Thus, because California's restriction against political parties endorsing primary election candidates unnecessarily curtailed political
63
speech, it violated the First Amendment.
The First Amendment even protects inaccurate campaign statements. 6 4 In Brown v. Hartlage,65 the Supreme Court reviewed a county
commissioner election that was invalidated under the Kentucky Corrupt
Practices Act (KCPA), due to a candidate's mistaken pledge to reduce
county commissioners' salaries while in office; Kentucky County Commissioners at that time, however, could not legally reduce their salaries while
in office. 66 Emphasizing the "special vitality" of free speech during election campaigns, the Court examined the KCPA's relevant provisions under
strict scrutiny. 67 The Court found that the KCPA's provisions were not
violated the First Amendment. See id. at 217-19 (providing various provisions of
California electoral law challenged by parties).
62. See id. at 224-26 (rejecting argument behind state's asserted compelling
interest). To assert a compelling interest in regulating speech, the government
must show more than the mere assertion that a restriction serves a compelling
interest, and, furthermore, that the regulated conduct or speech vitiates a compelling interest. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Va., 435 U.S. 829, 841 (1978)
(invalidating state criminal statute punishing disclosure of judicial ethics board
proceedings because state could not demonstrate that such sanctions preserve fair
administration of justice by mere conjecture).
63. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 229 (invalidating California's ban on political parties
endorsing political candidates in state primary elections).
64. For a discussion of the First Amendment's protection of inaccurate campaign speech, see infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
65. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
66. See id. (discussing prohibition against officials changing their salary while
in office). In 1979, Carl Brown ran against Earl Hartlage for a county commissioner seat in Jefferson County, Kentucky's "C" District. See id. at 47 (discussing
facts in Brown). During his campaign, Brown and a fellow party member remarked
that if elected, they would reduce their respective salaries by $3000 every year to
save taxpayer money. See id. at 48 (providing disputed promise in full). After making these statements, Brown learned that they likely violated the KCPA prohibiting
candidates from making any sort of pecuniary pledge to voters. See id. (discussing
facts of Brown). Brown retracted his pledge and subsequently won the election,
however, Hartlage brought an action under the KCPA to have the election nullified. See id. at 49 (describing procedural history in Brown). The act stated, "[n]o
candidate for nomination or election to any ...

county ...

office shall . . . prom-

ise ... or become pecuniarily liable in any way for money or other thing of value,
either directly or indirectly, to any person in consideration of the vote ... of that
person." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.055 (Michie 1982). Thus, the Supreme Court
essentially reviewed a state restriction against erroneous candidate statements during campaigns. See Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 52 (framing relevant analysis for First
Amendment purposes).
67. See id. at 54 (noting that KCPA directly circumscribed candidates' speech
to voters). The Court conceded that Kentucky had a compelling interest in maintaining fair and honest elections. See id. ("No body politic worthy of being called a
democracy entrusts .

.

. [its] selection of leaders to .

.

. process[es] of auction or
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"narrowly tailored" because the state had essentially pre-determined what
voters may or may not hear in the way of campaign speech. 68 Moreover,
because inaccurate speech is inevitable in any system emphasizing free political expression, the Court stated that the potential "chilling effect" of
imposing total liability for such misstatements violated the First
Amendment." 9
Thus, our government cannot function under the First Amendment
7
7
unless the electorate hears both sides of any issue. 11 In Wood v. Georgia,
the Court reviewed a county sheriff's state contempt convictions for criticizing a grand jury investigation into racial bloc voting that allegedly occurred in a local primary election. 72 The Court first determined that the
barter."). Although electoral restrictions that prohibit candidates from promising
money in return for electoral support is noble, the KCPA's practical effects were
not so clearly defined. See id. at 55 (conceding difficulty in distinguishing "hazy
line" between legal and illegal campaign promises). Kentucky also asserted an interest in allowing electoral access to candidates with less money and preventing
erroneous statements to the public. See id. at 54 (discussing Kentucky's claims of
compelling interests). The Court ultimately found, however, that Brown's statement did not warrant overturning the election because it was made in front of
voters subject to their praise and criticism. See id. at 57 (emphasizing lack of constitutional basis to equate Brown's statements as electoral bribery).
68. See id. at 60 (emphasizing Framers' trust in free exchange of ideas for
voters to decide veritable speech from false rhetoric during general elections).
The Court further stated that because voters could potentially make a bad choice
in voting for individuals who make questionable pledges during their campaigns,
such eventualities do not empower state governments to curtail speech. See id.
(stating priority of free speech over paternalistic political restrictions).
69. See id. at 61 ("'[W)e depend for ... correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.'"). For prohibitions like
the KCPA to be consistent with the principles of "robust political debate" contemplated by the First Amendment, it must give political speech the necessary room
for misstatements to be met with further speech that rectifies such erroneous remarks. See id. at 61-62 (finding Kentucky state interest in erroneous public statements not compelling enough to justify authority to curtail First Amendment
rights).
70. See id. at 60 (noting necessity for electorate to view both sides of important
issues).
71. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
72. See id. at 376 (discussing facts of Wood). A superior court judge in Bibb
County, Georgia issued a charge to the grand jury to investigate the alleged bloc
voting by African-American voters in a primary election. See id. at 376-79 (summarizing facts). To publicize this impending investigation, the judge personally summoned the local press to be present when the charge was issued. See id. at 378-79
(discussing background of Wood). According to the charge, African-American voters had pledged their support to one candidate, but bloc voted for the opposition
who had allegedly offered a large sum of money. See id. at 377-78 n.2 (setting forth
original charge in full). In response, the local sheriff issued a written statement to
the press criticizing the judge's actions as "race agitation" and an abuse of power to
intimidate minority voters and inflame local politics. See id. at 379-80 (quoting
sheriff as stating, "[i]f anyone in the community [should] be free of racial
prejudice, it should be our Judges. It is shocking to find ajudge charging a Grand
Jury in the style and language of a race baiting candidate for political office.").
The sheriff was subsequently charged and convicted of three counts of contempt
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sheriff had a personal stake in the primary election under investigation. 73
Reiterating that the First Amendment guarantees free expression, not censorship, of both sides of every issue in order to arrive at the ultimate truth,
the Court determined that the sheriff was unconstitutionally sanctioned
for his comments. 7 4 Thus, because the sheriff was an elected official affected by the outcome of the primary election under investigation, he was
75
certainly free to criticize the Grand Jury's charge.
Reviewing the First Amendment's general application to state elections reveals a fundamental distinction between electing judges and legislators. 76 While legislators appeal to broad constituencies, judges must
exude independence in the face of popular demand. 77 To further illustrate this distinction, courts generally uphold judicial campaign proscripfor his written press release; he was sentenced to concurrent sentences of twenty
days incarceration and separate fines of two hundred dollars for each count. See id.
at 382-83 (discussing procedural history of Wood).
73. See id. at 382 (noting sheriffs personal interest in outcome of primary
election because he faced winner in general election following year). Thus, Wood
addressed campaign speech under the First Amendment because the sheriff criticized legal wrangling taking place in response to a primary election that would
affect his campaign the following year. See id. (finding First Amendment's application to case at bar).
74. See id. at 388-89 (noting that free speech must be available to both sides of
every issue before society can make informed decisions as to proper courses of
action). The State argued that the sheriff's statement created a "clear and present
danger" to the fair administration ofjustice within the state. See id. at 387 (noting
bald assertions contained in trial and appellate record could not support such assertion). The Court disagreed, admonishing that "counterargument and education" should be used to counteract valid as well as erroneous statements that
criticize the fair administration ofjustice. See id. at 389 (stating expressly that state
governments cannot limit critical speech in order to avoid potential harm that
could result from such speech).
75. See id. at 395 ("The role elected officials play in our society makes it all the
more imperative that they be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of
current public importance.").
76. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2539 (2002) (explaining that First Amendment does not require judicial campaigns to sound like
legislative campaigns); Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th
Cir. 1993) ("Judges remain different from legislators and executive officials, even
when all are elected, in ways that bear on the strength of the state's interest in
restricting their freedom of speech."). It should be noted that it is speculative for
the electorate to vote for judicial candidates based upon their political or legal
ideology for two reasons: (1) state judges' jurisdiction over policy is limited, and
does not increase much as one moves up appellate court levels; (2) in appellate
and trial courts, it is impossible for a voter to predict with exact certainty which
judge orjudges will be assigned to adjudicate a controversy to which the voter has
an interest in the outcome. See Croley, supra note 4, at 731-32 (stating that voters
in legislative elections participate to acknowledge their citizenship and ideology,
while voters in judicial elections often have little incentive to vote).
77. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2550 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 266 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (noting
role of judges "is to decide 'individual cases and controversies' on individual
records," free of influence from constituencies); see also Justice De Muniz, supra
note 7, at 387 (discussing common, but erroneous belief that judicial elections
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tions against endorsing other candidates and personally raising campaign

78
Commoney; such conduct is generally essential to legislative elections.
mentators have even argued that judicial candidates should not directly
solicit votes. 79 Thus, the distinction between judicial and legislative elections impacts any constitutional analysis regarding judicial campaign restrictions.80 It should also be noted that the majority of relevant cases
81
concern legislative election restrictions.

should run similarly to other "constituency-driven political arm[s] of
government").
78. See Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct. of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d
Cir. 1991 ) (upholding constitutionality of Pennsylvania restriction on judicial candidates personally soliciting campaign funds and announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues); In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 603 So. 2d 494,
498-99 (Fla. 1992) (upholding Florida policy of restrictingjudicial candidates from
endorsing other candidates for public office); see also Haffey v. Taft, 803 F. Supp.
121, 125-26 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (allowing state prohibition of judicial candidates
from identifying political party affiliation); cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57
(1976) ("First Amendment . . . [rights deny] government the power to deter-

mine... [campaign] spending to promote one's political views."); C. Edwin Baker,
Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 11 (1998) (discussing campaign expenditure restrictions in light of recent Supreme Court rulings). But see Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 535 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming
district court's grant of preliminary injunction against state enforcing judicial canon prescribing campaign spending limits).
79. See Chisolm v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400-01 (1991) (extending amendment to 1962 Voting Rights Act to judicial elections, while acknowledging fundamental differences in judicial and legislative elections). In Chisolm,JusticeStevens
espoused his disagreement with state judicial elections stating that, "[t]he fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office and the real world
of electoral politics cannot be resolved by crediting judges with total indifference
to the popular will while simultaneously requiring them to run for elected office."
Id. (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens believed it would be "unseemly" for judicial
candidates and incumbents to engage in the normal activities of general elections
such as name identification and soliciting votes. See id. at 401 n.29 (expressing
concern over gradual deterioration ofjudicial elections in America); see also Wkite,
122 S.Ct. at 2546-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reiterating disagreement with state
judicial elections).
Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228 (acknowledging difference between
80. See, e.g.,
judges and other elected public officials in both function and selection).
81. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2539 (discussing Court's reliance on cases involving
free speech in legislative elections to illustrate misguided adherence to notion that
First Amendment protections are less urgent during elections). This Note acknowledges the arguably questionable propriety of relying upon cases involving
free speech in legislative elections to analyze similar issues in judicial elections,
however, the overwhelming bulk of First Amendment precedent concerning elections involves legislative contests, and the White Court relied heavily upon such
cases; thus, they are discussed in this Note. But see Robert M. O'Neil, National
Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment: The Canons in the
Courts: Recent First Amendment Rulings, 35 IND. L. REV. 701, 717 (2002) (discussing
impropriety of courts' reliance upon cases involving free speech in legislative elections to decide similar issues in judicial elections).
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Before Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,82 the courts were gener-

ally divided regarding whether states could constitutionally prohibit judi83
cial candidates from discussing disputed legal and political issues.
Judicial candidates challenged state provisions that prevented them from
commenting on divisive issues such as abortion, gun control and tort reform as being overbroad, vague and invalid under strict scrutiny. 84 In examining the constitutionality of state versions of the announce clause, the
courts have all initially recognized the fundamental distinction between
judicial and legislative elections.8 5 Moreover, insofar as such provisions
must be analyzed under strict scrutiny, the courts have generally recognized the states' compelling interest in an impartial judiciary and a reliable election process. 8 6 While the courts have generally examined state
proscriptions against judicial candidates' remarks on disputed issues
82. 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2542 (2002) (finding Minnesota judicial ethics' prohibition of candidates and incumbents announcing their views on disputed legal and
political issues unconstitutional).
83. Compare Stretton, 944 F.2d at 146 (upholding constitutionality of Pennsylvania prohibition against judicial candidates and incumbents announcing their
views on disputed legal and political issues), with Buckley, 997 F.2d at 231 (finding
same exact prohibition in Illinois unconstitutional), and ACLU v. The Fla. Bar, 744
F. Supp. 1094, 1099 (N.D. Fla. 1990) (same).
84. See Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 959-61 (4th Cir.
1992) (finding no overbreadth claim where state would not impose criminal or
civil sanctions on candidates commenting on disputed legal and political issues);
Beshear v. Butt, 863 F. Supp. 913, 917 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (finding Arkansas prohibition of judicial candidates and incumbents announcing their views on disputed
political and legal issues vague); Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Retirement & Removal
Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 315 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (granting restraining order
against commission's bringing charges, despite finding Kentucky prohibition of
judicial candidates and incumbents committing or appearing to commit to cases
by their campaign statements not vague); Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F.
Supp. 2d 967, 974-86 (D. Minn. 1999) (deciding challenge to Minnesota prohibition of judicial candidates and incumbents from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues under strict scrutiny standard).
85. See, e.g., Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228 (concluding that judicial candidates
should be treated differently than legislative candidates during campaigns). In
order to reach the appellant's claims that the Illinois version of the announce
clause violated his First Amendment rights, the Seventh Circuit first had to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear such claims. See id. at 226 (determining
that issues concerning standing and applicability of Rooker-Feldman Doctrine must
be addressed before turning to substantive claims). The court first determined
that plaintiffs did indeed have standing given the brevity ofjudicial elections and
the likelihood that the provision would be enforced against future candidates. See
id. (citing Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969)) (discussing standing issue).
Second, the court determined that Buckley's claim was not barred by the RookerFeldman Doctrine, which prevents federal district courts from exercising appellate
jurisdiction over state-court judgments, because he had merely sought a determination that the announce clause was unconstitutional and had not asked the court
to set aside the state's administrative findings. See id. at 227 (noting additionally
that although resjudicata might apply it had not been plead).
86. See, e.g., Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142 (acknowledging state's "deep concern" in
fair and honest electoral process, while recognizing compelling interest in impartial judges).
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under strict scrutiny, some cases have resulted in such provisions being
8 7
invalidated for other constitutional reasons.
Although courts are generally in agreement concerning the interests
at stake and the appropriate level of scrutiny, the results from their application of strict scrutiny are split.88 For example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit holds that the states' interest in preventing judges from "pre-judging" cases is fundamental, thus, the announce
clause maintains the concept of impartial justice."s ' The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, holds that despite the
states' asserted interest in administering impartial justice, such regulation
must comport with the First Amendment.9t) Thus, states cannot conduct
87. Compare Ackerson, 776 F. Supp. at 313 (applying strict scrutiny to Kentucky
prohibition against controversial judicial campaign speech), with Beshear, 863 F.
Supp. at 913 (determining whether Arkansas's proscription against judicial candidates announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues was vague).
88. For an example of divergent decisions regarding state proscriptions of
judicial candidates and incumbents announcing their views on disputed legal and
political issues, see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
89. See Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142 (emphasizing marked difference between judicial and legislative functions in holding Pennsylvania's announce clause narrowly
tailored to serve compelling state interest). It is important to note that the Third
Circuit discussed how the Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board (PJIRB)
had adopted a "narrow interpretation" of the announce clause so that it would
only apply to statements made concerning issues that were likely to come before a
candidate's respective court. See id. at 142-43 (noting that because PJIRB had
adopted certain interpretations during prior litigation, it was prohibited from
adopting different interpretations in subsequent litigation). The Third Circuit relied upon this limited reading of Pennsylvania's announce clause to bring itself
within the prudential rule that constitutional difficulties should be avoided in interpreting statutes and documents. See id. at 144 (citing EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp.
v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). But
see Buckley, 997 F.2d at 229 ("There is almost no legal or political issue that is tinlikely to come before . . . judge[s] of ... American court[s], state or federal, of

general jurisdiction."). It should also be noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's recent amendments to Pennsylvania's announce clause likely render St retton a moot case. See Blumenthal, supra note 15, at 1 (discussing amendments to
Pennsylvania's announce clause).
90. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 231 ("[T]he principle of impartial justice under
law is strong enough to entitle government to restrict the freedom of speech of
participants in the judicial process ... but not so strong as to place that process
completely outside the scope of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech."). In Laird v. Tatum, respondents moved nunc pro tunc for Justice Rehnquist to recuse himself from the case because he had previously testified before
Congress on related legal matters while working for the Justice Department. See
409 U.S. 824, 824-28 (1972) (memorandum opinion) (discussing facts giving rise
to opinion). Justice Rehnquist responded with a memorandum opinion denying
respondent's motion and defending his impartiality. See id. at 824 n.] (memorandum opinion) (detailing that such written opinion was appropriate because respondent's motion incorrectly interpreted relevant statutes). In discussing his
capacity to impartially hear the case, Justice Rehnquist asserted that it would be
impossible to find judges or justices that had not at least formed some "tentative
notions" regarding the law before their appointment or election to the bench. See
id. at 835 (memorandum opinion) (noting additionally that such notions often
come to public light entirely by "happenstance"). Moreover, even ifsuch individu-
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truly democratic judicial elections while repressing the candidates' constitutional rights simply because they are judicial candidates. 9' This disagreement over strict scrutiny's application, as well as the proper
distinction between judicial and legislative elections, led the Supreme
9
Court to resolve this conflict.

III.

2

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF White

In 1996, an attorney named Gregory Wersal (Wersal) ran for the Minnesota Supreme Court with the help of his family and a small campaign
committee. 93 As part of his campaign, Wersal spoke at numerous political

functions, identifying himself as both a Republican and a "strict-constructionist." 94 The Wersal Campaign also handed out literature criticizing the
Minnesota Supreme Court's prior decisions concerning abortion, crime
95
and welfare.
als who did not have any opinions regarding legal issues really existed, such a lack
of legal preconceptions would evince a lack of qualifications to the bench, rather
than impartiality. See id. (memorandum opinion) (noting lack of predisposition
on constitutional issues does not necessarily entail judicial impartiality).
Judges are not fungible; they cover the constitutional spectrum; and a
particular judge's emphasis may make a world of difference when it
comes to rulings on evidence, the temper of the courtroom, the tolerance for the proffered defense, and the like. Lawyers recognize this when
they talk about shopping for a judge; Senators recognize this when they
are asked to give their advice and consent to judicial appointments; laymen recognize this when they appraise the quality and image of the judiciary in their own community.
Id. (quoting Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 137 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
91. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 230-31 (distinguishing Stretton, although "precariously," insofar as it relied upon limited interpretation linking statements governed
by announce clause to those governed by prohibitions against making campaign
pledges); see also ACLU v. The Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D. Fla. 1990)
(ruling that judicial candidates and incumbents do not relinquish First Amendment rights merely by their involvement in such elections).
92. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 534 U.S. 1054, 1054 (2001) (limiting certiorari to issue of whether Minnesota's announce clause violates judicial
candidates' First Amendment rights).
93. See Republican Party of Minn. v.Kelly, 996 F.Supp. 875, 876 (D. Minn.
1998) (discussing relevant facts). Cheryl L. Wersal (wife) and Mark Wersal
(brother) took part in both Wersal's 1996 and 1998 campaigns, and were also parties to the ensuing litigation over Wersal's conduct during the course of those
campaigns. See id. (describing parties to case at bar). Wersal's campaign committee was cleverly named Campaign For Justice. See id. (recounting facts of case).
Wersal, his family and campaign committee will hereinafter collectively be referred
to as the "Wersal Campaign" where appropriate.
94. See id. (discussing 1996 campaign).
95. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir. 2001)
(discussing criticisms of Minnesota Supreme Court). According to Wersal, the
Minnesota Supreme Court's past decisions were "marked by their disregard for the
legislature and lack of common sense." Id. Wersal's campaign members and family members also spoke at these political gatherings to bolster support in what
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In May 1996, the Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility (Lawyers Board) received a complaint against Wersal alleging that
his attendance at partisan political events and solicitations for political
party endorsements violated the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct.9 6
The complaint was subsequently dismissed, however, Wersal ultimately
withdrew from the 1996 election, fearing that further complaints would
97
imperil his professional license.
In January 1997, Wersal announced his candidacy for a Minnesota
Supreme Court seat opening in 1998, and resumed campaigning as he
had in the 1996 election. 9 8 This time, however, Wersal faced new restrictions upon his campaign conduct, as well as administrative difficulty in
obtaining advisory opinions from the Lawyers Board concerning the ethical propriety of his campaign conduct. 99 As a result, Wersal filed a comamounted to an unsuccessful bid for the Republican Party's endorsement. See id.
(discussing background behind claim).
96. See id. (describing complaint); see also MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 5 (2002) (proscribing inappropriate political conduct by judicial candidates). The Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility operates
under the direction of the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board,
and is the administrative body charged with investigating and sanctioning ethical
violations committed by judicial candidates. See Kelly, 247 F.3d at 858 (describing
function of Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility). Because the
Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court both collectively referred to these administrative entities as simply the "Lawyers Board," this Note will hereinafter collectively
refer to them as the "Lawyers Board" as well. See Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2532 n.1 (2002), revg Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001)
(noting Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility and Minnesota
Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board referred to collectively as "Lawyers
Board"). Interestingly, it was a delegate to a Republican district convention that
filed the initial complaint against Wersal. See Kelly, 247 F.3d at 858 (noting Republican delegate filed complaint against Wersal).
97. See Kelly, 247 F.3d at 858-59 (noting complaint against Wersal dismissed by
Lawyers Board Director). The Director's written determination concluded that it
was unclear whether judicial candidates were barred from addressing political
functions in light of the Minnesota Supreme Court's amendments to the judicial
code in 1996; committee members, however, could seek political support. See id.
(delineating reasons for dismissal). Furthermore, the Director doubted that Minnesota's announce clause could be applied to Wersal's campaign statements, pointing out decisions from other jurisdictions either invalidating the clause or limiting
its applicability. See id. at 859 (discussing applicability of announce clause to Wer-

sal's campaign statements).
98. See id. (tracing Wersal's campaign activity from 1996 through 1998). The
Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards soon after petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court to amend the Code ofJudicial Conduct's Canon Five to preventjudicial candidates from speaking at political gatherings, as well as identifying with any
particular political parties. See id. (noting that Board of Judicial Standards was
state administrative entity charged with enforcing Minnesota's judicial code
against sitting judges). The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently adopted every
one of the Minnesota Board of Judicial Standard's recommendations in an effort
to clarify the non-partisan underpinnings of Canon Five in the state judicial code.
See id. (stating that these amendments took effectJanuary 1, 1998).
99. For a discussion of the Minnesota Board ofJudicial Standards reaction to
the Wersal Campaign's conduct, as well as the Minnesota Supreme Court's revision
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plaint in federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the
Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct's broad restrictions upon judicial
10
campaign conduct.X
( The district court, however, granted summaryjudgment to the Lawyers Board, narrowly construing the announce clause in
10 1
order to maintain its constitutionality.
of the state judicial code to prevent inappropriate partisan political activity, see
supra note 98 and accompanying text. In February 1998, Wersal initially requested
an advisory opinion from the Lawyers Board concerning the potentiality that he
would be sanctioned for ethical violations by speaking at political gatherings and
attempting to garner support with an endorsement by the Republican Party. See
Kelly, 247 F.3d at 859 (discussing background of case at bar). The Director's response opined that Wersal would be sanctioned for speaking at political functions
and soliciting political parties' endorsements, however, because Wersal had not
provided specific examples of disputed legal and political issues that he wished to
discuss, the Director could not comment on the announce clause's potential enforcement. See id. (discussing response of Lawyers Board Director to Wersal's advisory opinion request regarding legality of his campaign statements). But, the
Director did convey the Lawyers Board's concern that the announce clause could
not survive a "facial challenge to its Constitutionality," stating that such a provision
would not apply to statements unless they violated other provisions of the Minnesota Code ofJudicial Conduct. See id. (discussing relevant facts). According to the
Supreme Court, Wersal attempted a second time to obtain an advisory opinion
concerning the announce clause's applicability, this time providing specific, concrete examples of statements he wished to make. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2532 n.2
(discussing Lawyers Board's advisory opinion denial). Citing Wersal's pending suit
against the Lawyers Board, the Director declined to answer Wersal's request for an
advisory opinion at that time. See id. (discussing Wersal's denial). Interestingly,
the Eighth Circuit did not mention this alleged second request in its recitation of
the facts of this case. See Kelly, 247 F.3d at 857-61 (describing facts and background
of case).
100. See Kelly, 247 F.3d at 859-60 (describing complaint). Wersal, joined by
other political entities and individuals, filed his initial complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2002), alleging that Canon Five, including its version of the announce
clause, violated free speech and association under the First Amendment and denied him equal protection under the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. (discussing Wersal's legal claims for relief). In addition to the
plaintiff's constitutional claims, they moved for a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction to prevent Canon Five's enforcement during Wersal's campaign. See id. at 860 (describing Wersal's claims). The district court denied this
motion, and that order was affirmed. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 996 F.
Supp. 875, 880 (D. Minn. 1998) (denying plaintiffs' motion to temporarily enjoin
Minnesota Lawyers Board from enforcing Canon Five during Wersal's 1998 campaign), aff'd, No. 98-1625, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27946 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 1998).
101. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 985 (D. Minn.
1999) (noting that Minnesota Supreme Court construes statutes narrowly to avoid
constitttional difficulties). The district court found that the Minnesota Judicial
Code's provisions, including the announce clause, only applied to issues that were
likely to come before the court. See id. ("[T]he announce rule does not prohibit
judicial candidates from discussing or stating their views as to matters relating to
judicial organization and administration, or to other issues involving the character
of candidates, their background and experience."). The district court also held
that Canon Five's prohibition of partisan political activity was narrowly tailored to
serve the compelling state interest in an impartial judiciary. See id. at 980 (upholding Minnesota Judicial Code's Canon 5). Furthermore, the court held that the
Minnesota Code ofJudicial Conduct's ban on judicial candidates personally solicit-
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit emphasized Minnesota's interest in
eliminating judicial campaign speech that could potentially impair candidates' ability to impartially administer the law as a sitting judge. 10 2 Thus,
because the announce clause was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. '°3 In the interest of clarity, the Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the Minnesota announce clause. 0 4 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the issue of whether the announce clause violated the First
Amendment.

1

1

5

ing funds was perfectly legitimate. See id. at 982-83 (citing Stretton v. Disciplinary

Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 146 (3d Cir. 1991)).
102. See Kelly, 247 F.3d at 877 (pointing out that Minnesota's announce clause
prohibits statements regarding judicial candidates' views on state legislation's constitItionality as well as statements concerning how unsettled legal issues should be
resolved). The Eighth Circuit stated thatjudicial candidates who make campaign
statements announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues put themselves into an entirely tntenable position when they are called upon to render
impartial judgments when these issues come before them as sittingjudges. See id.
at 878 (discussing apparent tension created by judicial campaign speech).
103. See id. at 879-83 (distinguishing cases like Buckley that struck down similar
announce clause versions because those states allowed broader ranges of judicial
campaign speech than Minnesota). Wersal alleged that the Lawyers Board had not

met its burden of proof in regards to demonstrating a compelling state interest
served by a narrowly tailored provision. See id. at 878-79 (discussing relevant
claims). The Eighth Circuit rejected this contention, however, pointing out that
the Lawyers Board had introduced an overwhelming consensus among commentators thatjudicial campaign speech should be limited to avoid statements that allow
inferences of impropriety on the bench. See id. at 879 (expressing hesitancy to
allow too much leniency in judicial campaign speech). Thus, because an impartial, or at least allegedly impartial judiciary was an obvious compelling state interest, and the announce clause only prohibits statements concerning issues that may
come before the courts, the Eighth Circuit upheld the announce clause's constitutionality. See id. at 883 (upholding Minnesota's announce clause). Conversely, the
dissent emphasized that no matter how compelling a state's interest in maintaining
an impartial judiciary, such an interest cannotjustify trampling upon "constitutionally-enshrined" rights. See id. at 891-92 (Beam,J., dissenting) (emphasizing federal
courts' obligation to guard against state infringements upon constitutional guarantees). Although states may ban statements making illegal or corrupt promises, the
announce clause bans all types of campaign speech on disputed legal and political
issues. See id. at 894 (Beam,J., dissenting) ("I cannot fathom 'disputed legal issues'
more likely to come before a court than the proper role of stare decisis, narrow or
strict construction, original intent and substantive due process.").
104. See In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 639 N.W.2d 55, 55 (Minn. 2002) (ordering enforcement of Minnesota announce clause consistent with Eighth Circuit's interpretation in Kelly).
105. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 534 U.S. 1054 (2001) (granting
certiorari only to issue of whether Minnesota's announce clause is constitutional
tinder First Amendment). Suzanne White subsequently succeeded Verna Kelly as
Chairperson of the Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards, thus changing the
case's styling. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 1229, 1229 (2002)
(denying petitioner's motion for divided argument). The Supreme Court received
sixteen amicus briefs, six in support of reversal, nine in support of affirmance and
one supporting neither side, See generally Br. of Amici Curiae Am. Ctr. for Law and

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss3/5

22

Simmons: I Am Pro-Choice, Pro-Union and I Oppose Capital Punishment - I Wa
2003]

NOTE
IV.

933

CASE ANALYSIS

In addition to the majority opinion rendered in White, there were two
concurring opinions and two dissenting opinions; Part IV discusses these
various opinions. Part IV.A analyzes Justice Scalia's majority opinion,
while Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.2 respectively discuss Justices O'Connor's and
Kennedy's concurring opinions. Parts IV.C.1 and IV.C.2 respectively address Justices Stevens's and Ginsburg's dissenting opinions.
A. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia, delivering the majority opinion in White, began by summarizing the evolutions of Minnesota's judicial elections and the announce clause. 1U6 The Court pointed out that Wersal had sought a
second advisory opinion from the Lawyers Board, which was subsequently
Justice, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (No. 01-521)
(supporting reversal); Br. of Amici Curiae Am. Civil Liberties Union, Inc., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (No. 01-521) (same); Br. of
Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (No. 01-521) (same); Br. of Amici Curiae
Pub. Citizen Litig. Group, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528
(2002) (No. 01-521) (same); Br. of Amici Curiae State Sup. Ct. Justices, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (No. 01-521) (same); Br. of
Amici Curiae Minn. State Representative Phillip Krinkie & Eighteen Other Similarly Situated Legislators, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528
(2002) (No. 01-521) (same); Br. of Arnici Curiae Conference of ChiefJudges, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (No. 01-521) (supporting
affirmance); Br. of Amici Curiae Ad Hoc Comm. of FormerJustices and Friends
Dedicated to an Indep. Judiciary, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct.
2528 (2002) (No. 01-521) (same); Br. of Amici Curiae Brennan Center foriustice
at NYU Law Sch., et al., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002)
(No. 01-521) (same); Br. of Amici Curiae Cal., et al., Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (No. 01-521) (same); Br. of Amici Curiae Minn.
State Bar Ass'n, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (No.
01-521) (same); Br. of Amici Curiae Mo. Bar, Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (No. 01-521) (same); Br. of Amici Curiae Nat'l Assoc. of
Crim. Def. Law., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (No.
01-521) (same); Br. of Amici Curiae Pennsylvanians For Modern Cts., Republican
Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (No. 01-521) (same); Br. of Amici
Curiae Am. Bar Ass'n, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002)
(No. 01-521) (same); Br. of Amici Curiae Idaho Conservation League, et al., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (No. 01-521) (supporting
neither side). It was not surprising that the ACLU filed an amicus brief due to its
commitment to civil liberties. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27
(2001) (deciding propriety of government surveillance using new technology with
ACLU on amicus brief). For a discussion of certain parties being bound to certain
issues, see infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
106. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2531-32 (2002)
(providing various provisions of state law under which judicial candidates and incumbents may be sanctioned for violating Minnesota's announce clause). For a
discussion on Minnesota's judicial elections as well as the announce clause, see
supra notes 40-41, 50, 52 and accompanying text.
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denied. 117 Interestingly, the lower courts' opinions did not mention Wer°8
sal's second attempt.'
In its analysis, the Court first sought to clarify the Minnesota announce clause's true meaning before undertaking its constitutional examination."' 9 The Court determined that Minnesota's announce clause
prohibits candidates from expressing their current position on disputed
issues, while a separate provision prevents candidates from promising to
decide issues a certain way. 110 Despite this concrete distinction between
Minnesota's announce clause and its "improper pledges" clause, the Court
maintained that certain campaign restrictions under the announce clause
were not so obvious from its language."II For example, the announce
clause prevents candidates from criticizing past court decisions if the can107. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2532 n.2 (addressing dissent's concern that petitioners had not suffered any actual constitutional harm).
108. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 996 F. Supp. 875, 876 (D. Minn.
1998) (including Wersal's first request for advisory opinion concerning application
of Minnesota announce clause, but not second request), affJd, No. 98-1625, 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 27946, at **2-3 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 1998) (same); see also Republican
Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 972-74 (D. Minn. 1999) (same), affd,
247 F.3d 854, 857-60 (8th Cir. 2001) (same). This is not to imply that the lower
courts were disingenuous by not stating that Wersal had sought a second advisory
opinion providing concrete examples of statements. In fact, the lower courts may
not have known that Wersal sought a second advisory opinion concerning the announce clause's scope because the request allegedly occurred after Wersal filed
suit. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2532 n.2 (providing director's response: "[T]here is
pending litigation over the [announce clause's] constitutionality ....
[in which]
[y]ou are a plaintif. .. and you have sued ... me as Director ....
[d]ue to ...
[which], I will not be answering your iequest for an advisory opinion at this
time."). Nonetheless, this is an important fact, which was only mentioned in the
majority opinion in White. See id. at 2531-32 (discussing relevant facts).
109. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2532 (interpreting announce clause as prohibiting
judicial candidates from stating views on disputed issues and promising to decide
these issues in certain ways).
110. See id. (noting that announce clause proscribes candidates' statements
concerning their current views on disputed legal and political issues even if candidates do not adhere to those views as sitting judges); see also MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(a)(3)(d)(i) (2002) (providing Minnesota announce
clause). Thus, Minnesota's announce clause operates independently of, and is not
a mere restatement of Minnesota's ban on judicial candidates and incumbents
pledging to rule a certain way on particular issues. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2532
(stating unequivocally that Minnesota campaign pledges clause separately prohibits candidates from making such statements rather than Minnesota's announce
clause); compare MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2002)
(announce clause), with MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)
(2002) (pledges clause).
111. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2532-33 (discussing Wersal Campaign literature's
various statements touching upon disputed legal and political issues that Minnesota's Lawyers Board decided did not fall within ambit of announce clause). The
Court's apparent reason for listing examples of Wersal's campaign literature that
did not violate the announce clause was to further illustrate other limitations of
the announce clause that are not so apparent. See id. (discussing legal bounds of
Minnesota's announce clause).
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didate further states that he or she would not adhere to stare decisis. 112
The Court found that the announce clause's limited application to issues
"likely to come before the court" could not properly circumscribe such a
provision's application, and, furthermore, that permitting "general" discussions of judicial philosophy in campaign elections is no help to the
electorate. 113
Having identified the Minnesota announce clause's scope, the Court
next examined the viability of free speech in light of the clause's limitations upon judicial campaign speech.' 1 4 Minnesota's announce clause
had to be "narrowly tailored, to serve a compelling state interest" in order
to withstand strict scrutiny.' 15 The Eighth Circuit's decision relied heavily
upon Minnesota's compelling interest in an impartial judiciary, as well as
the appearance of an impartial judiciary. 116 Finding impartiality to mean
either a lack of bias toward parties or legal views or general "open-minded112. See id. at 2533 ("[Clandidates must choose between stating their views
critical of past decisions and stating their views in opposition to stare decisis."). Justice Ginsburg, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the announce clause does
not in fact prohibit candidates from stating their views on past court decisions
within the context of stare decisis under the Eighth Circuit's construction of that
provision. See id. at 2552-53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority
should not accept counsel's response to spontaneous questions during oral argument as conclusive application of announce clause). The majority addressed this
criticism by pointing out that the Eighth Circuit never addressed the announce
clause's application to candidates' statements of past court decisions within the
context of stare decisis. See id. at 2533 n.4 ("Silence is hardly inconsistent with what
respondents conceded at oral argument.").
113. See id. (citing Buckley v. 111.
Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th
Cir. 1993) (stating that there are hardly any issues that are unlikely to come before
courts of general jurisdiction)). At oral argument, the Lawyers Board asserted that
the Eighth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the announce clause prevents it from
being applied any more broadly than the clause's 1990 amended version. See White
122 S.Ct. at 2534 n.5 (discussing Minnesota announce clause's application in light
of Kelly); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (ii) (1990)
(replacing broad prohibition against candidates announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues with narrow prohibition against statements that
appear to commit candidates with respect to issues likely to come before them as
judges). The Court rejected this argument because the Minnesota Supreme Court
did not amend Minnesota's announce clause to conform with the ABA's 1990
code. See White, 122 S.Ct. at 2534 n.5 (noting that ABA agrees with Lawyers
Board's arguments despite amending its code to avoid constitutional problems).
114. See White, 122 S.Ct. at 2534 (noting announce clause's limitations on
judicial campaign speech and examining its effect on First Amendment right to
free speech). It should be noted that the Lawyers Board argued that the announce
clause still permitted candidates to discuss such topics as allowing cameras in
courtrooms as well as "character, education and work habits." See id. (discussing
scope of Minnesota's announce clause).
115. See id. (citing Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489
U.S. 214, 222 (1989)) (identifying strict scrutiny as proper constitutional analysis
for state election proscriptions bearing directly upon campaign speech). For a
discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis of campaign speech restrictions under
strict scrutiny, see supra notes 57-58, 62-63, 67-69, 84, 86-88 and accompanying text.
116. See White, 122 S.Ct. at 2535 (concluding that interest in impartial judges
as well as judges appearing impartial was indeed sufficiently compelling).
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ness," the Supreme Court considered these asserted state interests in its
strict scrutiny analysis. 117
The Court first applied strict scrutiny by defining the compelling interest of impartiality as a "lack of bias for or against either party to ... [a]
proceeding." 118 Because Minnesota's announce clause prohibits judicial
candidates from stating their views for or against certain issues, the Court
concluded that it was not narrowly tailored to prevent bias toward certain
litigants.' 19 Judges who had previously announced their views on certain
disputed issues would thus likely rule against any party taking the opposite
position. 121
Next, the Court applied strict scrutiny by defining the compelling interest of impartiality as an unbiased disposition towards particular issues.12' The Court asserted that selecting judicial candidates who lacked
any predisposition toward disputed legal and political issues was neither
attainable, nor desirable. 12 2 In fact, ajudicial candidate lacking any tentative conclusions concerning disputed legal and political issues would be
117. See id. (emphasizing that impartiality's meaning must be clarified to analyze Minnesota's announce clause under strict scrutiny). Neither the Eighth Circuit, the parties' briefs nor the ABA and Minnesota Codes of Judicial Conduct
defined impartiality, despite its categorization as a compelling state interest. See id.
(discussing "impartiality's" lack of meaning). The Lawyers Board argued that an
impartial judiciary is essential to preserving litigants' due process guarantees, while
the appearance of an impartial judiciary maintains public confidence in the judicial and legal system. See id. (discussing relevant arguments).
118. Id. (defining lack of bias for or against parties as judges "apply[ing] the
law to .. . [them] in the same way . .. [they] appl[y] .. .it to any other party").

The Court also cited various cases illustrating the supposedly inextricable nexus
between impartial judges and due process. See id. (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 523, 531-34 (1927)) (finding due process violation where judge presided over
case in which it was in his financial interest to find against one party).
119. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2535 (emphasizing that Minnesota's announce
clause solely restricts speech concerning political and legal issues, rather than
speech concerning prospective parties). Justice Scalia addressed the dissent's assertion that the Minnesota announce clause preserves the state's interest in an
impartial judiciary to various litigants. See id. at 2536 n. 7 (noting some speech
prohibited by announce clause may exhibit bias against parties). Although the
Court did not deny that Minnesota's announce clause prohibits speech that could
present a potential bias against certain parties, nonetheless, the provision was not
narrowly tailored to serve such an interest. See id. at 2535-36 (noting that strict
scrutiny is not concerned with whether state prohibitions serve compelling state
interests "at all," but rather whether such prohibitions are narrowly tailored to
achieve such ends).
120. See id. (noting that such judges would be impartially administering justice as they believe it to be).
121. See id. at 2536 ("This sort of impartiality would be concerned, not with
guaranteeing litigants equal application [under] the law, but rather with guaranteeing them an equal chance to persuade the court on the legal points in their
case.").
122. See id. (emphasizing that it would be "virtually impossible" to findjudicial
candidates who had never even thought about divisive issues that could potentially
come before courts). justice Scalia quoted Chief Justice Rehnquist's observation
that,
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less qualified for the bench than a candidate whom the Minnesota announce clause would deem "biased."' 123 Thus, the futility in pretending
that judicial candidates could or should not have any views on disputed
legal and political issues aptly demonstrated that the announce clause
24
could not serve a compelling interest to that end.'
Lastly, the Court discussed impartiality, defined as "open-mindedness," as a compelling state interest under strict scrutiny.125 The Lawyers
Board argued that open-mindedness prevents judges from feeling pressured to rule consistently with prior statements they may have made during a campaign. 1 26 The Court, however, rejected this argument because
judges' campaign statements only constitute minimal commitments to legal positions, and, furthermore, judges have often committed themselves
to a position on these issues prior to the elections anyway. 1 27 Moreover,
[s]ince most Justices come to this bench no earlier than their middle
years, it would be unusual if they had not by that time formulated at least
some tentative notions that would influence them in their interpretation
of the sweeping clauses of the Constitution and their interaction with one
another. It would be not merely unusual, but extraordinary, if they had
not at least given opinions as to constitutional issues in their previous
legal careers.
Id. (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (memorandum opinion)).
123. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2536 (citing Laird, 409 U.S. at 835) (noting that
lack of opinions or views on constitutional issues indicate judges' lack of qualification, not lack of bias). The Court noted that Minnesota's Constitution actually
forbids electing judicial candidates that do not have any views on the law, because
it requires that all state judges be "learned in the law." See id. (citing MINN. CONST.
art. VI, § 5).
124. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2536 (dismissing notion that announce clause
serves compelling state interest).
125. See id. (definingjudges' open-mindedness as their willingness to consider
legal views in opposition to their own). The Court emphasized that open-mindedness exists to afford litigants only some chance of winning the legal points of their
case as opposed to an equal chance. See id. (defining open-mindedness for purposes of impartiality).
126. See id. at 2536-37 (asserting interest in "open-mindedness").
127. See id. at 2537 (citing Laird, 409 U.S. at 831-33) (illustrating formerJustice Black's participation in cases determining constitutionality of Fair Labor and
Standards Act when he wrote such legislation, as well as former Chief Justice
Hughes's opinion overruling one prior decision that he had criticized in his book
written before his nomination to Supreme Court). The Court pointed out that
judicial candidates and incumbents have often already expressed their views on
disputed legal and political issues either in past opinions, books or even course
lectures. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2537 (noting that Minnesota and ABA judicial
codes both encourage judges to engage in teaching, giving speeches and writing
books concerning legal issues when time permits). Justice Stevens, however, argued that judges would feel enormous pressure not to contradict prior campaign
statements in their subsequent rulings. See id. at 2547-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(expressing concerns over unlimited judicial campaign speech). Justice Scalia addressed this argument by distinguishing the pressure judges feel not to contradict
prior campaign statements from campaign promises. See id. at 2537 ("[Olne would
be naive not to recognize that campaign promises are-by long democratic tradition-the least binding form of human commitment."). Nonetheless, any pressure
judges might feel not to rule inconsistently with a prior campaign statement cer-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

27

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48: p. 911

because the announce clause attempted to pursue the compelling interest
of open-mindedness solely during judicial elections, it was "woefully
28
under-inclusive."1
Finding that Minnesota's announce clause was not narrowly tailored
to serve these asserted state interests, the Court explicitly rejected the notion that judicial elections were an exception that would allow for circumscribed First Amendment rights. 129 Additionally, the Court rejected the
Eighth Circuit's assertion that prohibiting judicial candidates' speech on
disputed legal and political issues was a longstanding tradition. 13° Having
tainly cannot compare with the pressure not to rule inconsistently with a prior
principled opinion that has been thoroughly researched. See id. at 2537-38 (defending free judicial campaign speech's effect upon judicial impartiality).
128. See id. at 2537 (citing City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52-53 (1994))
(finding inference of unconstitutionality from government's underinclusive attempt to ban all signs and messages within city limits to avoid "visual clutter"). The
Court further noted that the Lawyers Board failed to carry their burden of proof
that campaign statements present a danger to judicial candidates' open-mindedness. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2538 (citing Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Va.,
435 U.S. 829, 841 (1978)) (requiring more than state's bald assertions that criminal sanctions for publishing judicial conduct board's proceedings are necessary to
preserve public confidence in state judiciary).
129. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2538 (citing Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1989)) (reiterating that free and open
debate on candidates' qualifications remains essential to American electoral process). Justice Ginsburg emphasized that judges would feel pressured not to rule
inconsistently with their prior campaign statements because they could very likely
not be re-elected, losing their salary and emoluments. See White, 122 S.Ct. at 255657 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that judges deciding cases in ways that could
increase their prospects for re-election violates due process). Justice Scalia addressed this argument asserting that judges always face the prospect of not getting
re-elected, therefore, the announce clause, standing alone, could not ameliorate
such a dilemma. See id. at 2538-39 (stating syllogism that ifjudges that hear cases
in which ruling for one side could increase their chances for re-election violates
due process, then judicial elections themselves violate due process). Justice Scalia
subsequently addressed the remainder of Justice Ginsburg's arguments, stating
that they criticized arguments that the majority did not purport to make. See id. at
2539 (asserting that majority opinion does not stand for proposition that First
Amendment requires judicial and legislative elections to be conducted similarly).
Justice Scalia argued that even ifjudicial elections were constitutionally subject to
greater regalation, the announce clause still could not withstand a strict scrutiny
analysis. See id. (refuting assertion that Minnesota's announce clause passed constitutional muster). Justice Scalia stated:
[w]e rely on the cases involving speech during elections, only to make the
obvious point that this underinclusiveness cannot be explained by resort
to the notion that the First Amendment provides less protection during
an election campaign than at other times.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted). Furthermore, the dissent had "exaggerated"
the difference between judicial and legislative elections because state judges have
far-reaching power not only to "make common-law," but to interpret and influence
state constitutions as well. See id. at 2539-40 (citing Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864
(Vt. 1999)) (interpreting Vermont constitution to afford same-sex couples similar
statutory benefits and protections extended to married, heterosexual couples).
130. See White, 122 S.Ct. at 2540 (emphasizing that practice of proscribing
judicial candidates' and incumbent's speech on disputed legal and political issues
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determined that the announce clause removes speech of interest to voters
outside the judicial campaign arena, the Court found that it was in conflict
with the Minnesota Constitution's provisions for general elections.1 - '
Thus, Minnesota had an interest in an impartial judiciary, however, the
state could not serve such an interest by impermissibly restricting judicial
32
candidates' First Amendment rights.'
B.

The Concurring Opinions

1. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, but expressed concern
over the propriety of judicial elections. 133 Justice O'Connor argued that
public confidence in judicial impartiality was severely undermined by the
fact that judges could not humanly ignore election implications when
hearing high-profile cases.1 3 4 The evils allegedly prevented by the announce clause also paled in comparison to the problems raised by fundraising in judicial elections. 135 Nonetheless, because Minnesota
consciously chose to elect its judiciary, the state itself had concurrently
is "neither long nor universal"). The Court noted that states have still not unanimously adopted either the 1972 or 1990 ABA Model Code's version of the announce clause. See id. at 2541 (stating that relatively recent practice of proscribing
judicial campaign speech on disputed issues cannot be harmonized with constitutional prohibitions of long-sta*nding tradition).
131. See id. (noting that disparity between announce clause and notion of
democratic elections is attributable to ABA's opposition to judicial elections). For
a discussion of the debate over whether judges should ideally be elected or appointed, see supra notes 3-10, 27-35 and accompanying text.
132. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 254142 (providing that states who utilize democratic processes to elect public officials must provide their candidates sufficient
constitutional leeway to fully effectuate such democratic endeavors).
133. See id. at 2542 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (expressing concern that judicial elections themselves could potentially undermine state interest in selecting
impartial judges).
134. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that public confidence in judiciary would be low if judges suppressed their awareness of consequences their
decisions have on elections). According to former California Supreme CourtJustice Otto Kaus, ignoring the political consequences of highly publicized decisions
is "like ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub." See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(citing Julian N. Eule, Ira C. Rothgerber,Jr. Conference on ConstitutionalLaw: Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government: Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter
Initiatives and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. Rv. 733, 739 (1994))
(expressing concern of judicial impartiality in face of elections).
135. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2542 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that
judicial candidates' reliance upon campaign donations in order to be elected
causes judges to be indebted to certain parties or potential litigants). Even if
judges were completely independent from their financial supporters upon being
elected, the possibility that judges could be persuaded by campaign contributions
does little to preserve public confidence in the judiciary. See id. (citing Kate
Thomas, Are Justices in Texas Getting Bought?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 16, 1998, at A8) (discussing Texas Supreme Court campaign contributions made by parties associated
with current litigants).
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generated the conflict between judicial candidates' free speech rights and
136
the state's interest in an impartial judiciary.

2. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy argued that because
the announce clause was a content-based speech restriction that prohibited speech typically protected under the First Amendment, it was facially
invalid.' 3 7 Minnesota's announce clause prohibits speech alone, and not
traditional exceptions to First Amendment protections such as obscenity,
defamation or inciting dangerous and criminal acts.1 3 8 Thus, because the
announce clause prohibited speech at the "heart of the First Amendment," Minnesota was not constitutionally permitted to impose such a direct restriction.' 3 9 Furthermore, despite Minnesota's apparent interest in
maintaining an impartial judiciary, the state could not maintain a truly
democratic election process in which candidates were effectively
gagged.1 41 Interestingly, Justice Kennedy pointed out that the Court was
not addressing the issue of whether states may generally restrict judicial
speech by prohibiting judges from commenting on disputed issues at all
136. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2544 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that Minnesota's choice of popular elections over appointive system demonstrates its voluntary undertaking of risk ofjudicial bias).
137. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing that Minnesota's announce clause prohibited speech that could not be categorized within traditional
First Amendment exceptions such as obscenity, defamatory speech and speech inciting lawless action).
138. See id. (KennedyJ, concurring) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (stating that no further analysis is required where state restrictions
simply proscribe non-exceptional speech based upon its content).
139. See While, 122 S. Ct. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that direct
restrictions placed on content of candidates' speech is beyond government's
power).
140. See id. at 2545 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[S]tate[s] cannot opt for...
elected judiciar[ies] and then assert that [their] democracy, in order to work as
desired, compels the abridgment of speech."). Justice Kennedy maintained, similarly to the majority, that even if judicial campaign speech could be misused or
evinced certain biases, then other candidates, the media and interest groups
shotld exercise their free speech rights to point out these candidates' deficiencies.
See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting that combining free speech with elections can advance public understanding of law as well as adhere to its lofty endeavors). Such considerations cotdd thus only lead to a conclusion that the announce
clause is unconstitutional on its face. See id. at 2546 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("By
abridging speech based on its content, Minnesota impeaches its own system of free
and open elections."). It should be noted thatJustice Kennedy was very careful to
caution against criticizing various states' decisions to maintain an elected judiciary.
See id. 2545-46 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing hesitancy to criticize state
judicial selection methodology). If the Supreme Court were to condemn systems
of elected judiciaries in any manner, the Court would also implicitly impugn many
learned state judges who are beyond any such reproach. See id. at 2546 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (reiterating need for deference to state judicial selection methods).
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times.1 4 1 Whether this distinction will prompt states with elected judiciaries to enact such measures, thus generating further litigation and administrative wrangling, remains open.
C.
1.

The Dissenting Opinions

Justice Stevens's Dissenting Opinion

Concerned with the potential impact that the Court's reasoning could
have, Justice Stevens's dissent began by emphasizing the White decision's
limited reach. 14 2 The Lawyers Board could still inform voters of ajudicial
candidate's impropriety in discussing disputed issues even if it could not
prevent that candidate from making such statements. 143 Nonetheless, Justice Stevens's main contention was that the Court had not only underestimated judicial impartiality as a compelling state interest, but also
erroneously assumed thatjudicial candidates are entitled to the same cam144
paign speech rights as legislative candidates.
141. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983)) (questioning outcome when speech restrictions are placed on sitting
judges, whether campaigning or not). The rationale behind an attempt at proscribingjudicial speech concerning disputed legal and political issues all the time,
not just during elections, would be to promote "the efficient administration of
justice." See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2546 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing methods of First Amendment compliance).
142. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I] find the Court's reasoning more
troubling than its holding.").
143. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that majority's reasoning caused
more concern than its actual holding). Agreeing with the majority's caveat that
more speech could be the only constitutional solution to abusive campaign speech,
Justice Stevens was nonetheless troubled by the Court's alleged effort to blur the
lines between legislative and judicial elections. See id. at 2546-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reiterating difference between judicial and legislative elections).
144. See id. (Stevens,J., dissenting) (emphasizing that notwithstanding apparent difficulties that elected judges face as opposed to appointed judges, state
judges must adhere to higher principles no matter how they are selected). Justice
Stevens illustrated the critical distinction between legislative and judicial work insofar as legislators determine policy based upon popular sentiment, while judges
must interpret the law in the face of and often against popular demand. See id. at
2547 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[C]ountless judges in countless cases routinely
make rulings that are unpopular and surely disliked by at least 50 percent of the
litigants who appear before them."). Conversely, judges also must enforce rules
and regulations that they do not agree with, thus, opinions that they may have held
before being elected cannot automatically impeach them because, "every good
judge is fully aware of the distinction between the law and a personal point of
view." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens further argued that the Court
did not mention that most state judicial elections are not for state Supreme Court
seats but for lower court positions. See id. at 2547-48 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing misleading effect of allowing unregulated judicial campaign speech).
As such, judicial candidates discussing disputed legal and political issues not only
impugn the lofty station in which they seek, but mislead the electorate because
judges are bound to follow the law regardless of personal ideology. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating concern over unreguldated judicial campaign speech).
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Justice Stevens also disagreed with the Court's strict scrutiny analysis. 14 5 As a lack of bias against litigants, Minnesota's interest in judicial
impartiality was served by the announce clause because certain litigants
are usually relegated to certain positions on certain issues. 146 Moreover,
insofar as impartiality denotes ajudicial candidate's open-mindedness, the
announce clause prevents statements that directly indicate a candidate's
foregone conclusions regarding certain disputed issues. 1 47 Thus, Justice
Stevens found that the Court had ignored prior decisions affirming an
impartial judiciary's essential nature, and, furthermore, that the Court's
decision was fundamentally flawed because it would permit judicial cam148
paigns to be conducted similarly to legislative campaigns.
2.

Justice Ginsburg'sDissenting Opinion

Justice Ginsburg echoed Justice Stevens's argument concerning the
fundamental distinction between judges and legislators. 149 Judges func145. See id. at 2548 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that states should not be
forced "to an all or nothing choice of abandoning judicial elections or having elections in which anything goes").
146. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding compelling state interest in judicial impartiality). A hypothetical candidate who expressed his or her consistent
record of affirming rape convictions would in fact express a bias against certain
litigants. See id. (StevensJ., dissenting) (hypothesizing). In rape cases on appeal,
prosecutors are usually seeking such favored affirmance, while defendants seek to
have their convictions overturned, something Justice Stevens's hypothetical candidate is decidedly against. See id. (Stevens,J., dissenting) (disputing majority's assertion that Minnesota's announce clause cannot maintain impartiality). For a
discussion of certain litigants being linked to certain positions on legal issues, see
infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
147. See id. at 2549 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (contending that lawyers who write
articles advocating certain views do not commit themselves to such views to same
degree as judicial candidates espousing certain views in their campaign speech).
Campaign statements concerning disputed legal and political issues further mislead voters that candidates' qualifications in judicial elections should be similar to
those in legislative elections. See id. at 2549 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing
Justice Kennedy's assertion that content-based restrictions are per se invalid because such rule would preclude states from preventing judicial candidates from
making improper pledges).
148. See id. at 2549 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for forgetting
its prior determination that maintaining public confidence in disinterested judges
is compelling). Justice Stevens reiterated that public confidence in the judiciary
could only be enhanced by its impartiality, something that "may not be borrowed
by the political Branches to cloak their work in the neutral colors of judicial action." Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
407 (1989)) (concluding that participation of federal judges on Federal Sentencing Commission did not undermine judicial impartiality).
149. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2550 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating "Ij]udges
perform a finction fundamentally different from that of the people's elected representatives"). Without an impartial judiciary, Justice Ginsburg believes that the
rights and privileges under law "would amount to nothing." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)). In discussing Minnesota's system of an elected judiciary, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the state opted for non-partisan elections because
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tion solely to interpret the common law and constitutions, therefore, such
a confined role cannot respond to the whims of popular sentiment. 15°1
According to Justice Ginsburg, the Court erroneously relied upon cases
involving legislative elections.1 5 1 Although the Court recognized a conflict between the announce clause and an elected judiciary, Justice Ginsburg argued that its ruling relied upon the misguided assertion that
Minnesota's departure from an appointive judicial selection system con1 52
currently departed from the relevant criteria in that system.
the participation of political parties could undermine the judicial role. See While,
122 S. Ct. at 2550 (GinsburgJ., dissenting) (citing Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d
418, 425 (Minn. 1992)).
150. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2551 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ('judges ... are
not political actors.").

151. See id. at 2551-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that public's ability
to choose elected representatives necessitating free speech does not extend tojudicial elections). Justice Ginsburg thus rejected the majority's reliance upon cases
such as Brown v. Hartlage to support its proposition that free speech is essential to
any election. See id. at 2551 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting O'Neil, supra note
81, at 717) ("[H]ow any thoughtful judge could derive from... [Brown v. Hartloge]
any possible guidance for cases that involve judicial campaign speech seems baffling."). For a discussion ofJustice Scalia's rationalizing the Court's reliance upon
cases involving legislative elections, see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
Minnesota should have thus been able to restrict Wersal's campaign speech by
methods that would otherwise be unconstitutional in legislative elections. See
White, 122 S. Ct. at 2552 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing difference between judicial and legislative elections).
152. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2552 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing how
information on "subjects of interests to the voter" are relevant to informed judicial
selections). Within the context of federal judicial nominations and confirmations,
especially for Supreme Court positions, nominees traditionally draw the line in
answering questions that would intimate their position on issues and how they
would potentially rule in certain cases. See id. at 2552 n.1 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting)
(noting that majority's rationale would characterize federal judicial nominees' decisions not to answer such questions as depriving political branches of valuable
information to aid in confirmation). The federal tradition ofjudicial nominees
declining to espouse their views on such issues demonstrates the fact that there is
nothing inherently wrong in our democracy with not disclosing certain information regarding candidate qualifications to those charged with selecting such candidates. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (disputing propriety ofjudicial campaign
speech). Justice Ginsburg pointed out that during Justice Scalia's confirmation
hearings, then-Judge Scalia declined to comment on whether he would overrule
certain cases saying,
I think it is quite a thing to be arguing to somebody who you know has
made a representation in the course of his confirmation hearings, and
that is, by way of condition to his being confirmed, that he will do this or
do that. I think I would be in a very bad position to adjudicate the case
without being accused of having a less than impartial view of the matter.
Id. at 2558 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Roy M. MERSKY & J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON
SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE

SENATEJUDICIARY COMMITrEE, 1916-1986 131 (1989)). Justice Scalia addressed Justice Ginsburg's example of his Senate confirmation hearing by asserting that the
Court was not holding that candidates could be compelled to announce their views
on disputed issues; because candidates can voluntarily decline to answer such questions, it follows that coercion to answer cannot be legitimate. See White, 122 S. Ct.
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Justice Ginsburg next asserted that the Court had "distorted" the announce clause's application. 1 53 First, the Court did not acknowledge the
fact that the announce clause merely prohibited candidates from espousing how they would decide issues. 154 The Eighth Circuit allegedly construed the announce clause to permit certain highly informative
comments including historical facts such as the number of convictions a
candidate might have obtained as a prosecutor.' 55 Second, the Court
inaccurately described the announce clause's application to candidates
discussing prior court decisions, according to Justice Ginsburg. 156 The
Court's interpretation that judicial candidates cannot discuss prior court
decisions if they mention stare decisis was improperly gleaned from oral
argument rather than the Eighth Circuit's and Minnesota Supreme
15 7
Thusjudicial canCourt's decisions concerning the announce clause.
didates could discuss and even criticize prior court decisions if they did
not intimate how they would rule upon similar issues if they were
58
elected.1
at 2539 n.l (citing Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 836 (1972) (memorandum opinion)) (defending unregulated judicial campaign speech).
153. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2552 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that
proper resolution of cases "requires correction of the court's distorted construction of the provision"). The majority characterized the announce clause as prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing their views on "any nonfanciful legal
question" coming before the court in which they are running unless the candidates are discussing past decisions without declaring whether they would be bound
by stare decisis. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (illustrating Court's supposedly
misguided analysis).
154. See id. at 2553 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reiterating that Minnesota's announce clause does not bar candidates from making general statements regarding
their legal views).
155. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that candidates could make
qualified statements like, "Judges should use sparingly their discretion to grant
lenient sentences to drunk drivers," and sufficiently general statements like,
"Drunk drivers are a threat to the safety of every driver," without facing sanctions).
Justice Ginsburg thus enunciated that only statements that could potentially reveal
how a candidate would rule on certain issues are prohibited under the announce
clause. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (using "I think all drunk drivers should
receive the maximum sentence permitted by law" to exemplify proscribed
comments).
156. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that Minnesota's announce
clause "does not prohibit candidates from discussing appellate court decisions").
157. See id. (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (highlighting that "on the spot answers"
to hypothetical questions at oral argument are not always accurate legal opinions).
According to Justice Ginsburg, the majority should not have relied upon interpretations elicited during oral argument in light of the Eighth Circuit's researched
decision interpreting the announce clause. See id. (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (citing
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 170 (1972)) ("We are loathe to attach
conclusive weight to the relatively spontaneous responses of counsel to equally
spontaneous questioning ... during oral argument.").
158. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2553-54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Wersal never suffered any constitutional violations because he was never formally
sanctioned).
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Justice Ginsburg further argued that the Court did not account for
the Minnesota announce clause's interdependence on the state's proscription againstjudicial campaign pledges and promises. 159 Judicial impartiality is essential in fostering due process because judges who decide cases in
which they have a direct or indirect stake in the outcome could potentially
deny litigants a fair hearing. 160 Justice Ginsburg further asserted that
16 1
judges who may be potentially biased could still violate due process.
The mere semblance of quid pro quo between judicial candidates and the
electorate can thus only disserve public esteem of the judiciary and its ability to impartially administer the law. 162 Thus, the announce clause was
valid under the First Amendment because it preserved a potential litigant's due process rights and maintained public confidence in the
163
judiciary.
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The White decision is subject to scrutiny in both its legal analysis and
practical implications. Notwithstanding the dissent's arguments, the
Court's decision was principled in analyzing the announce clause under
159. See id. at 2554 (GinsburgJ., dissenting) (opining that "the constitutionality of the Announce Clause cannot be resolved without an examination.., in light
of the interests the pledges or promises provision serves").
160. See id. at 2555 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (providing various cases where
sittingjudge's interest in each case's outcome caused it to be overruled). In order
to determine whether ajudge's participation could violate due process, courts look
to, "'whether the ...situation is one which would offer a possible temptation to
the average man as a judge [that] might lead him not to hold the balance nice,
clear, and true.'" Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Ward v. Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57, 60 (1972)) (invalidating town's collection of fines from defendants where
sitting judge was also town's mayor).
161. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that
due process does not require actual showing that judge is biased due to self-interest). According to Justice Ginsburg, past cases involving potential due process violations due to sitting judges' interests have consistently turned upon whether those
judges could discharge their duties impartially. See id. at 2556 n.3 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citingJohnson v. Miss., 403 U.S. 212, 215 (1971) (per curiam)) (involving sitting judge who was successfully sued under civil rights guarantees by
petitioner).
162. See White, 122 S.Ct. at 2557-58 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding
that by "targeting statements that do not technically constitute pledges or
promises," Minnesota's announce clause prevents companion provisions from being circumvented).
163. See id. at 2558 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that pledges and
promises clause would be useless without announce clause). Candidates would be
able to "circumvent" state prohibitions of making pledges or promises in judicial
campaigns simply by not using phrases such as "I promise." See id. (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("Semantic sanitizing of the candidate's commitment would not, however, diminish its pernicious effects on actual and perceived judicial impartiality.").
Thus, without the announce clause, the non-partisan nature of Minnesota's judi-

cial elections would eventually diminish. See id. at 2559 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about alleged ease with which judicial candidates could
circumvent Minnesota's improper pledges clause after White).
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strict scrutiny. ' 4 The dissent was correct to point out that the majority
had relied upon distinguishable cases such as Brown v. Hartlage,165 that
dealt with legislative elections. 1 66 However, the majority relied upon cases
such as Brown solely to establish the general premise that state campaign
speech restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest. 1 6 7 Thus, one can only direct criticism, if any, toward the Court's
analysis of the announce clause under strict scrutiny.
As a compelling state interest, the Court keyed in upon three possible
meanings of impartiality: (1) lack of bias toward certain legal views; (2)
general open-mindedness toward competing views of the law; and, (3) lack
of bias toward potential and actual litigants.' 6 8 The White Court's discussion of impartiality as a lack of bias toward certain legal views undoubtedly
164. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (determining that strict
scrutiny will more likely be applied where state electoral restrictions directly implicate First and Fourteenth Amendment rights). But see White, 122 S. Ct. at 2544
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that courts should not even have to engage in
strict scrutiny analysis where electoral restrictions are content-based). Justice Stevens criticized Justice Kennedy's assertion that content-based election restrictions
are per se unconstitutional. See id. at 2549 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting
that Justice Kennedy's analysis would invalidate Minnesota's improper pledges
clause as well). The problem with Justice Stevens's argument is that Justice Kennedy carefully stated that only content-based restrictions that do not qualify as an
exception under traditional First Amendment jurisprudence should be invalidated
without applying strict scrutiny. See id. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding
per se invalidity of campaign speech restrictions not traditionally excepted from
First Amendment protections).
165. 456 U.S. 45 (1982) (reversing state court's invalidation of county commissioner election results where candidate pledged to reduce his salary upon being elected, although state law did not actually allow county commissioners to
modify their salaries while in office). For a discussion of Brown, see supra notes 6469 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., White, 122 S. Ct. at 2551 (GinsburgJ., dissenting) (citing O'Neil,
supra note 81, at 717) (arguing that relying upon cases dealing with legislative
elections to invalidate state electoral speech restrictions is "grievously misplaced").
Justice Scalia addressed this criticism by claiming that the Court merely relied
upon cases such as Brown to illustrate the fact that the announce clause was underinclusive because it only restricted speech during judicial elections, and that such a
deficiency could not be reconciled by claims that speech restrictions were more
justified within the context of judicial elections. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2539 (defending judicial campaign speech).
167. See id. at 2535 (citing Brown to reiterate that states must show that restrictions do not "unnecessarily circumscribe protected expression" to be characterized
as "narrowly tailored"). For a discussion of Justice Scalia's defending the Court's
reliance upon cases dealing with legislative elections, see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
168. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2535 (stating possible meanings of "impartiality").
It should be noted thatJustice Scalia was sure to point out that impartiality was not
defined in any judicial ethical codes or the Eighth Circuit's opinion on the issue,
despite the fact that all of these sources mention the term quite frequently. See id.
("Clarity on... [impartiality's definition] is essential before we can decide whether
impartiality is indeed a compelling state interest, and, if so, whether the announce
clause is narrowly tailored to achieve it.").
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took a very realistic approach. 169 No person, especially one who would
endeavor to be considered a learned member of the bench, can honestly
claim to never have considered or even taken a position on divisive political and legal issues. 170 Individual opinions upon divisive issues such as
abortion, welfare and crime are often based in deeply held idiosyncratic
values. Practically speaking, a judicial candidate professing absolutely no
position on such issues would certainly evince a lack of qualifications for
the bench because 'judges represent the law." 17 1 Thus, the Court correctly asserted that Minnesota's interest in maintaining a judiciary free
from preconceived notions regarding disputed issues, something truly im172
possible to accomplish, was not a compelling state interest.
It is well settled that judges should be open-minded to both sides of
any dispute in order to fairly administer justice.173 The White Court concluded that campaign statements represent a small portion of actual public commitments to legal positions that judges make.' 74 However, this
conclusion does not account for the fact that even if campaign statements,
in fact, represent diminutive commitments by judicial candidates, such
candidates did not formerly have the sort of latitude in making campaign
statements as they would after White.' 75 This is not to mean that judicial
candidates will definitely conduct their campaigns similarly to legislative
candidates as a result of White, however, it does remain to be seen exactly
what changes will occur in state judicial elections.' 76 Furthermore, these
arguments are moot in light of the fact that the announce clause is too
underinclusive to ever achieve any such open-mindedness because judicial
169. See id. at 2536 ("A judge's lack of predisposition regarding the relevant
issues in a case has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice...
it is virtually impossible to find a judge who does not have preconceptions about
the law.").
170. See id. ("[I]t is virtually impossible to find a judge who does not have
preconceptions about the law.").
171. Id. at 2550 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Chisolm v. Roemer, 501
U.S. 380, 411 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824,
835 (1972) ("Proof that a Justice's mind ... [when] he joined the Court was a
complete tabula rasa . . . [concerning] constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.").
172. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2536 (discussing how judges obviously come to
bench with years of experience that have shaped and influenced their views on
legal and political issues).
173. See id. at 2536-37 (finding, however, that it was unlikely that Minnesota's
announce clause was enacted solely for such purpose). The Court determined
that open-mindedness merely guarantees litigants some chance of persuading
judges to rule in their favor rather than an equal chance. See id. at 2536 (defining
impartiality).
174. See id. at 2537 (addressing arguments that announce clause preserves
open-mindedness by removing pressure that judges may feel to rule certain ways
after publicly commenting upon such issues during their campaign).
175. See id. ("[S]tatements in election campaigns are such an infinitesimal
portion .

.

. [ofjudges' actual commitments to post-election conduct].").

176. For a discussion of White's potential effects upon Pennsylvania judicial
elections, see infra notes 188-206 and accompanying text.
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candidates are only prohibited from commenting on disputed issues dur77
ing their campaigns.1
Notwithstanding its analytical inconsistency, the Court correctly determined that the announce clause was underinclusive because it sought to
78
maintain impartiality solely within the context of judicial elections.'
One cannot truly expect to preserve public confidence in judicial impartiality when judges are prohibited from announcing their views on divisive
issues solely during election campaigns. 179 For example, a judge proclaiming his or her allegiance to a certain political party after dismissing
an equal protection challenge to a state's legislative redistricting plan is no
less biased than a judicial candidate proclaiming such allegiance during
an election.
Finally, the White Court's discussion concerning judicial impartiality
defined as a lack of bias against parties was flawed.'I8
The Court defined
this subspecies of impartiality as judges' ability to apply the law equally to
all parties coming before them.' 8 ' Because the announce clause prevents
actual or perceived bias against certain issues rather than parties, the
82
Court found it was not narrowly tailored to prevent bias against parties. 1
The Court's conclusion, however, does not acknowledge the fact that certain parties are inevitably going to take certain positions on certain issues.' 183 For example, potential litigants such as criminal defendants, the
177. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2537 (noting that most candidates have already
made up their minds regarding disputed issues through past judicial opinions or
in articles written on such subjects).
178. See id. (citing City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52-53 (1994)) (finding
local ordinance that prohibited signs in order to avoid visual clutter violated First
Amendment because that method of achieving government interest in maintaining character of area did not prohibit any other potential eye sores).
179. See White, 122 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (discussing how judges have already
formed, and many times espoused their legal and political views prior to becoming
judges, thus making state prohibitions against such speech solely during elections
ineffective).
180. See id. at 2535-36 (discussing how judges' views on specific issues may
indicate bias against particular parties' arguments in litigation, thus impacting parties themselves who make those arguments).
181. See id. at 2535 (stating that cases cited by respondents and amici define
impartiality similarly to illustrate proposition that impartial judges are essential to
due process).
182. See id. at 2535-36. Justice Scalia annunciated the distinction between bias
against issues and parties as,
when a case arises that turns on a legal issue on which the judge (as a
candidate) had taken a particular stand, the party taking the opposite
stand is likely to lose. But not because of any bias against that party, or
favoritism toward the other party. Any party taking that position is just as
likely to lose. The judge is applying the law (as he sees it) evenhandedly.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
183. See id. at 2548 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's assertion
that judges' bias against particular legal views cannot also apply to litigants themselves). Justice Stevens alluded to this dilemma stating, "[e]xpressions that stress a
candidate's unbroken record of affirming convictions for rape, for example, imply
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American Civil Liberties Union and the United States Justice Department
each have traditionally been inextricably bound to certain positions on
issues concerning civil liberties.'1 4 Thus, parties who have taken an opposite stance to views espoused by a judge within the context of campaign
speech could potentially suffer due process violations if that judge was to
hear their case. Practically speaking, this concern will not always be as
great a threat as the White dissenters purport, because "every good judge is
fully aware of the distinction between the law and a personal point of
view."' 8 5 Furthermore, such potential issues of impartiality do not change
gagthe fact that Minnesota chose to prevent such problems by effectively
8 6
gingjudicial candidates within the context of a popular election.'
The Court's decision in White should also be analyzed for its practical
implications upon state judicial elections. Part V focuses on Pennsylvania,
announce clause to Minnesota's, to
a state that formerly had an identical
8 7
discuss White's practical effects.1
VI.

WHITE'S POTENTIAL EFFECTS UPON PENNSYLVANIA'S
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

Pennsylvania's next judicial elections will take place later this year. 18 8
It should be noted that judicial candidates in Pennsylvania still may not be
able to announce their views on disputed legal or political issues, depending upon how the amendments to Pennsylvania's former announce clause
are interpreted.18 9 After White, a mere formal filing was all that prevented
a bias in favor of a particular litigant (the prosecutor) and against a class of litigants (defendants in rape cases)." Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
184. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (deciding Fourth
Amendment issue in which ACLU, in amicus brief, argued for reversal due to government's use of thermal imaging to gather evidence from inside defendant's
home). Tangentially, the ACLU filed an amicus brief in White arguing reversal due
to the announce clause's implications upon First Amendment rights. See Br. of
Amici Curiae Am. Civil Liberties Union, Inc., Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002) (No. 01-521) (supporting reversal).
185. White, 122 S.Ct. at 2547 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. See id. at 2528 ("The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted a canon...
that prohibits a candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or
political issues.").
187. See PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) (1) (c) (2002) ("A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for ajudicial office, that is filled.., by public
election . . . should not . . . announce his views on disputed legal or political

issues."). This Note simply seeks to identify and briefly discuss the immediate and
potential changes that could take place during subsequent judicial elections in
Pennsylvania in the wake of White.
188. See Walsh, supra note 52, at A15 (commenting on what impact, if any,
White will have on Pennsylvania's upcoming judicial elections).
189. See PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) (1) (c) (2002) (providing
former announce clause); see also Blumenthal, supranote 15, at 1 (" [C] hange [s] to
Canon 7B(1)(c) and Rule 15D(3) involve[ ] adding a provision in conformance
with the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct."). Before
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took action, the former Pennsylvania announce
clause still stood, despite the ruling in White. See Walsh, supra note 52, at A15
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Pennsylvania's former announce clause from being invalidated. 19 ° Thus,
there was never a question of whether White would affect Pennsylvania's
judicial elections, but how.
The one potential effect that has come to fruition was that the state
supreme court would amend Pennsylvania's judicial code to track the
ABA's 1990 Model Code.' 9 1 Despite the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
timely action to rectify the situation, it remains to be seen whether the
amendments to Pennsylvania's former announce clause will generate further litigation concerning what types of statements actually appear to precommit candidates to a particular side of an issue. 19 2 Any such litigation
("[White] will not affectjudicial elections in Pennsylvania unless and until someone
challenges the current law, or... [Pennsylvania's] Supreme Court takes action.").
It is currently unknown how the amendments to Canon 7(B)(1)(c) will be enforced. See Blumenthal, supra note 15, at 1 (discussing uncertainty of ABA Model
Code's provision replacing Pennsylvania's former announce clause).
190. See Walsh, supra note 52, at A15 (stating that ruling in White will not impact Pennsylvania "unless and until someone challenges the current law").
191. See Blumenthal, supra, note 15, at 1 (discussing amendments to Pennsylvania's former announce clause); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (ii) (1990) ("A candidate forjudicial office shall not make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court."). Given the tenuous
situation with which Pennsylvania judicial candidates were left after White, it
seemed quite likely that the state supreme court would take action. Cf Cucchi v.
Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 574 A.2d 565, 579 (Pa. 1990) (Cappy, J., dissenting)
("History has shown that there are occasions in which judicial activism is appropriate and even mandated by the judiciary's inherent responsibility to protect the
citizens of this Commonwealth... [but] this power is easily abused and should be
sparingly utilized only in matters of extraordinary social importance."). It should
also be noted that the ABA's 1990 Model Code separately retains the 1972 Model
Code's prohibition against making promises or pledges of conduct in office other
than impartially administering the law. See MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (i) (1990) (providing improper pledges clause). It thus seems that
the ABA perhaps sought to modify the announce clause so as to turn it into an
extension of its prohibition against improper campaign promises to prevent statements that sub silentio indicate how judicial candidates would rule upon certain
issues. Cf White, 122 S. Ct. at 2554-56 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (arguing that Minnesota's announce clause must be examined in light of other provisions proscribing judicial campaign promises and pledges other than to impartially administer
justice).
192. For a discussion of Pennsylvania's former and current announce clause
and the implications of White, see supra notes 50, 52 and accompanying text. According to public sentiment, the likelihood of judicial candidates and their supporters filing formal complaints with the Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review
Board is quite high given that sixty-nine percent of those surveyed in a recent poll
believe that the "conduct and tone" of state judicial elections is gradually declining. See Reasonable Doubt;Judges Are Right to Wony About Campaigns, Pir. PosT-GAZET-rE, Feb. 19, 2002, at A8 [hereinafter Reasonable Doubt] (discussing public
perception of judicial elections in Pennsylvania). For example, during the 2001
Pennsylvania Supreme Court race, Republican candidate Michael Eakin, then a
superior court judge, and Democratic candidate Kate Ford Elliott, also a superior
court judge, became embroiled in numerous debates over each other's campaign
tactics. See Dennis B. Roddy, Supreme Court Race a Debate on Tactics; Eakin, Elliott
Battle over Campaign Ads, PITT. POsT-GAzE-ruE, Nov. 4, 2001, at C9 (discussing vari-
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will undoubtedly be public, taking place during an election, and it could
perhaps further adversely affect the public's perception of judicial
1 93
campaigns.
Another potential change in Pennsylvania judicial elections, though
an unlikely one, would be one in which judicial candidates would attempt
to exercise self-restraint in order to preserve public confidence in the judiciary. 194 This potential change is unlikely because judicial candidates may
not always have total control over the tone of their supporters, and, furthermore, the realities of modern races for public office often dictate otherwise. 19 5 Nonetheless, this begs the question of whether more or less
speech should exist in judicial elections.1 96 Opponents of White, along
with its dissenting opinions, often resort to a slippery slope argument in
which judicial candidates become the mirror images of legislative candidates. 197 One may or may not accept the majority's conclusion in White
that free speech is actually a safeguard against judicial candidates abusing
their campaign speech rights, however, the abusive speech dilemma envisioned by White's dissenters has yet to occur. 198 Additionally, if judicial
candidates were to police themselves without any official guidance regarding the recent amendments to Pennsylvania's former announce clause,
199
such a situation could potentially lead to self-censorship.
ous instances of legal wrangling between judicial candidates). One such instance
caused supporters for Judge Kate Ford Elliot to sue in order to have a Virginiabased group withdraw television ads that "attacked" Judge Ford Elliott. See id.
(describing legal wrangling that took place). Supporters for then-Judge Eakin also
went to court to have a television ad made on behalf ofJudge Ford Elliott taken off
the air. See id. (describing campaign conflict). Thus, judicial candidates and their
supporters would more than likely file complaints over ambiguous campaign statements, in which the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, the Supreme Court's Disciplinary Board and courts would likely have to engage in factual inquiries to
determine whether these statements appear to commit candidates in advance to
cases.
Roddy, supra note 192, at C9 (describing heated Pennsylvania
193. See, e.g.,
Supreme Court judicial race between then-Judge Michael Eakin and Judge Kate
Ford Elliot).
194. See id. (exemplifying that despite candidates' best intentions, campaigns
for public office often become contentious and bitter in tone).
195. See id. (discussing legal action taken by both candidates in Pennsylvania's
2001 Supreme Court race against supporters of their opponent).
196. See Walsh, supra note 52, A15 (discussing issue of judicial candidate
speech after White).
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2555 (2002)
197. See, e.g.,
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that allowing judicial candidates to conduct
campaign speech similarly to legislative candidates will impeach judicial impartiality and create potential due process violations). For a discussion of Justice Ginsburg's dissent, see supra notes 149-63 and accompanying text.
198. But see White, 122 S.Ct. at 2555 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing
fears that judicial candidates will destroy their legitimacy by exercising broad free
speech rights after White).
199. See Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973) (stating that "First
Amendment [rights] need breathing space"). This concern that individuals could
potentially restrain themselves from exercising otherwise protected speech and
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Finally, a third potential impact that White could have upon Pennsylvania's judicial elections is to cause a complete reevaluation of the
state's judicial selection system. 2 00 After all, questions of judicial impartiality within the context of judicial elections ultimately lead to questions
regarding how a state should select its judges in order to preserve their
public esteem. 2°1 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has, albeit in vain,
already appointed committees to examine judicial campaign contribution
reforms. 2°12 Thus, the fallout from White could provide enough justification for Pennsylvania to amend its constitution to provide for an appointive judicial selection system. 203 The problem with simply ridding
Pennsylvania of judicial elections, however, is that appointive systems are
2 4
just as inherently abusive. 11
VII.

CONCLUSION

White brought a dilemma that was lurking in the background of state
judicial selections systems for over 200 years into specific relief. Can a
state judicial selection system respect candidates' First Amendment rights,
while maintaining the essentially impartial nature of the judiciary?
challenging statutes has also given rise to many constitutional challenges to state
statutes as being overbroad. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §

11.2.2 (1997) (collecting cases).

200. See Reasonable Doubt, supra note 192, at A8 (discussing recommendation
by Pennsylvania Judicial Council to begin appointing state judges).
201. See id. (stating that surveyedjudges are concerned about deterioration of
state judicial elections).

202. See Throw Out the Baby, supra note 37, at A8 (discussing various state remedies to Pennsylvania's judicial selection problems). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court appointed a commission to appraise the state's judicial elections in 1998
that concluded the state should limit campaign spending and contributions. See id.
(describing disappointing state of Pennsylvania's judicial elections). Unless judicial candidates request public campaign funding, however, they have a constitutional right to raise and spend as much money as they deem necessary. See, e.g.,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) ("The First Amendment denies the government the power to determine that spending to promote one's political views is
wasteful, excessive, or unwise."). Recently, then-Chief Justice John P. Flaherty requested a Judicial Council ad-hoc committee to review other possible solutions to
the judicial campaign funding dilemma; the committee concluded that Pennsylvania should adopt an appointive selection system to resolve the presently flawed
system. See Throw Out the Baby, supra note 37, at A8 (arguing that Pennsylvania's
judges should be appointed like federal judges).
203. See Reasonable Doubt, supra note 192, at A8 (arguing that Pennsylvania
judges should be selected by appointment by Pennsylvania's Governor, with Senate
confirmation).
204. For a discussion of appointive and elective systems of selecting judges,
see supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text. This Note recognizes the fact that
one could easily write a book about the election/appointment debate alone.
Thus, this Note simply seeks to illustrate the arguments of both sides to this ongoing debate as well as its relevance to White's immediate and potential effects upon
Pennsylvania's future judicial elections.
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To conclude, White has the potential to affect judicial elections, especially Pennsylvania's in a number of ways. Although no one will know just
what will happen until the 2003 elections begin, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court currently has seized the opportunity to administratively remedy the situation. 20 5 Furthermore, the issue of judicial candidate speech
unfortunately points to a much larger problem looming in the background of how to equitably select our judges.2 0 6 Thus, time will only tell
whether White has presented new problems for Pennsylvania's judicial elections, and, if so, whether the solution lies in Pennsylvania's Supreme Court
or in the Pennsylvania State Legislature.
S. Graham Simmons III

205. For a discussion of judicial elections in Pennsylvania and the impact of
White, see supra notes 188-206 and accompanying text.
206. See Throw Out the Baby, supra note 37, at A8 (citing Pennsylvania Judicial
Council Committee as being convinced "that the present system of electing

judges . . .is seriously flawed and cannot be adequately reformed by part-way

measures").
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